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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain the carbon emissions markets; what they are, how 
they work and what determines the carbon price. With a focal point on the EU ETS, the 
thesis deals with these problems with thorough explanations built on a large reference base 
together with economic and financial analysis. A distinct line has to be drawn between 
compliance and voluntary markets, with the EU ETS as the compliance powerhouse. Several 
carbon emissions products are currently available for trading with EUA futures being the 
most commonly traded. Major price drivers for the EU ETS allowances are political 
decisions, fuel/power prices, CDM supply and weather. In the analysis of Chapter 4.3, 
CAPM Beta for EUA Dec08 was set to be around 0.20 with only explaining ~2% of the 
asset‟s total risk. From the regression analysis we can infer that no linear relationship exists 
between returns on EUA Dec08 futures and the rate of return on the overall European stock 
market. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the carbon emissions market by providing thorough 
explanations of the marketplaces and trading with a focus on the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The main analysis consists of CAPM Beta estimation and a 
regression analysis of the relationship between the EU ETS carbon price and main European 
stock markets. 
1.1 Interest in the topic 
 At NHH and other institutions as well as other arenas, carbon markets are often 
known to the masses but not very much understood from a theoretical point of view. This 
leads to myths and unanswered questions about a heavily growing asset market and one of 
the most interesting measures taken to combat climate change. Compliance and voluntary 
markets, products traded and the economics behind them can often be confused, and it is 
thus difficult for individuals and businesses to follow the developing carbon emissions 
market. Hence, the background and motivation for the thesis was this feeling of a lack a 
good carbon emissions market overview at NHH. In addition, upcoming markets‟ 
developments are exciting and challenging to explore. After having taken several master 
courses in finance, the financial aspects of the trading and the relation to the stock markets 
variation has been an area of interest as well. This background and motivation has 
contributed to the structure of the master thesis. The word „carbon‟ is used for both CO2 
(Carbon Dioxide) and other greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). This is more thoroughly 
explained in Figure 2.1 on page 13. 
It should be clarified that the author of this thesis has not taken a political standpoint 
about climate change and it is just the thrill and interesting economic and financial aspects of 
a new emerging market that has caught the interest. Broadly speaking, two main schools of 
thought on how best to address the threats posed by climate change exist: 
1) The IPCC/UNFCCC/Kyoto position, which is that mitigation of climate change is 
essential; 
2) The position of those skeptical that Kyoto can deliver meaningful benefits, who argue 
that, wherever possible, adaptation is a more practical response. 
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Critics and those skeptical often argue that the economic costs of implementing carbon 
dioxide emissions cuts would by far exceed the benefits and that the reasons for a global 
climate change is far more complicated and influenced by other mechanisms than man-made 
carbon emissions.
1
 Olav Kårstad, the author of “Keeping the lights on” (Universitetsforlaget 
2007) and leader of StatoilHydro‟s carbon capture and storage (CCS) think tank, supports 
the first school of thought and has provided the following equation of the options the world 
have to reduce emissions:
2
 
CO2 Emissions = Population x (GDP/Population) x (Energy/GDP) x (Emissions/Energy) 
Everyone uses energy and the number of people on the planet is an important determinant of 
the total energy used and hence the level of emissions. Their wealth, expressed as average 
GDP per capita, explains that generally a higher GDP per capita implies a higher use of 
energy. The energy intensity of the population‟s activities is reflection the fact that different 
individuals or countries use more or less energy than others and is expressed in the equation 
as the amount of energy use per unit of GDP. The emissions produced by their energy 
technologies explain that each and every means of using or supplying energy can be 
associated with a certain amount of CO2 emissions, which is expressed as the emissions per 
unit of energy supplied or used in the equation. Since global population is still increasing 
and most countries are striving for and expect higher standards of living in the future, 
reducing the left-hand side of the equation is proven rather complicated. Consequently, 
energy intensity and technology shifts will have to drive the development. As one of many 
means for this, carbon emissions trading is believed to help cutting emissions in the most 
cost efficient manner. This thesis will thus work on this stand point. 
1.2 Perspective and statement of the thesis problem 
The perspective taken in order to write this thesis has been rational explanation and analyses. 
Although very difficult, political agendas and other emotional influences about climate 
change and the global warming debate that usually flourish in reports about the carbon 
market have been locked out. Other political themes such as the successfulness of carbon 
                                                 
1 Newsnight 7/4/08 - Nigel Lawson & Chis Rapley; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=74E2D6oNSHc  
2 Freund, P., Kaarstad, O (2007): Keeping the Lights on. (In Chapter 5: p86-86). Universitetsforlaget   
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trading will not be dealt with. This thesis‟ goal has simply been to explore the fact of rising 
carbon emissions trading based on as good facts as possible and rational economic analysis. 
The following full thesis title and statement of the problem has thus been developed: 
Carbon Emissions Markets  
–  
What are they? How do they work? And what determines the carbon price? 
Chapter 2 about the Marketplace explains what they are and where they come from by using 
broad and thorough explanations built on a large reference base and economics textbook 
examples. Chapter 3 about the Trading explains how they work by presenting structured 
carbon trading information on a financial and economic theoretical basis. The focus in 
Chapter 3 is turned more and more towards the EU ETS and in Chapter 4 about A Price for 
CO2 in the EU, the main carbon price drivers will be presented assisted by professional 
research from Point Carbon. Furthermore, Chapter 4 presents the main analyses of price 
developments with CAPM Beta estimation and regression analyses of the relationship 
between EU ETS allowances and the main European stock markets. Chapter 5 will provide a 
short summary of the chapters and suggestions for further studies by presenting interesting 
aspects of carbon emissions trading worth to follow in the future. Full references list, 
appendices and a glossary of abbreviations are attached at the end.  
This thesis is international business in the highest sense. Carbon emissions trading 
requires international markets in order to work in its most efficient way, and trading of 
carbon allowances in the EU has risen sharply since the introduction of the EU ETS in 2005. 
Capitalization, instead of amounts of emissions traded is used in this thesis in order to 
explain the size of the market, Euro (€/EUR) is the main currency, and the language used is 
US English. The average CO2-price in the EU in 2008 (January 1
st
 – June 18th) was €23.30.3  
1.3 Limitations and general remarks 
 The very comprehensive nature of this thesis has led to many constraints and 
limitations. Concessions were made and general explanations of broad areas had to be 
                                                 
3 European Climate Exchange website, Market Data, ECX Historical Data, EUA08 Futures: http://www.ecxeurope.com/ 
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preferred to more thorough financial and economic analysis of smaller areas. This is a 
limitation of the thesis and one may argue that it is far too general. However, the wide range 
of the thesis has been a serious challenge for the author and necessary to provide good 
explanations of the set of themes in order to explain the statement of the problem. This sets 
the thesis apart from other more technical and analytical theses. Writing alone on such a 
comprehensive thesis about a relatively new area of study has also been a challenge and has 
contributed to limitations in the discussions and analyses. The changing political climate of 
carbon emissions markets throughout the process has also been a challenge. This is another 
limitation of the thesis since some of the information provided might become outdated in 
short time. It has however been an interesting journey and this thesis will add some 
interesting new information to the NHH knowledge base, and hopefully spark a deeper 
interest in the fast-changing sphere of carbon emissions markets.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
Kristian A. Fossland  
June 18
th
, 2008 
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2. The marketplace 
2.1 Emergence of emissions markets 
This part of the thesis will examine the history behind emissions trading and the emergence 
of the well-known Kyoto Protocol and the only existent emissions market, the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme. The analysis will also discuss the different systems of 
carbon markets and the economic rationale behind emissions trading.  
2.1.1 History 
The emergence of a carbon emissions market is not the sole example of emissions trading. 
But to be able to understand the emergence of this market, a brief of the fundamental 
thoughts behind it will create an essential background. Emission trading has a long 
theoretical history, and this paragraph will show that there are examples of well-functioning 
emissions trading markets already. 
The antecedents of emissions trading can be traced back to the theories of 
“Ecological Economics”, “Free-market environmentalist” and the newer term “Eco-
capitalism”. Ecological Economics started with the Romantics of the 1800s and its ideas 
dealing with the social and ecological costs of an uncontrolled industrial expansion and how 
to operate an economy within the ecological constraints of the biosphere.
4
 Ecological 
Economists have, among others, advocated the view that the market is unable to correct the 
negative externalities of industrial production and excessive depletion of non-renewable 
resources. For example, a firm may receive the full benefit of producing pollutant waste if it 
is not required to pay the full social costs of contaminating the environment. In this situation, 
the firm keeps all the benefits of an activity itself but shifts responsibility for the costs to all 
citizens and future generations.  
 Free-market environmentalist does however oppose this by arguing that the free 
market, property rights, and tort law provide the best tools to preserve the health and 
sustainability of the environment.
5
 Such a free market is in sharp contrast with a controlled 
                                                 
4 Common, M. and Stagl, S. 2005. Ecological Economics: An Introduction. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
5 Anderson, T L & Leal, D R (2001) Free-market environmentalism. Palgrave Macmillan 
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market of emissions set up by governments, although not all aspects of the public domain are 
believed to be easily privatized. It might thus be impossible to establish property rights on 
things like air and water that circulate the globe. A lot of free-market environmentalists as 
well as “Eco-capitalists”6 therefore often support emissions trading schemes for polluting 
gases, although it compromises free-market thoughts of many economists. One of the 
world‟s most influential environmentalists isn‟t an environmentalist at all. He is not an 
activist, conservationist or politician. Richard L. Sandor
7
, the founder, chairman and CEO of 
the Chicago Climate Exchange, more than anyone else invented the idea of emissions 
trading. Sandor turned his attention to air pollution in the late 80s, when acid rain, caused by 
pollutants from coal plants, factories and cars, was fast becoming one of the biggest 
environmental threats facing the industrialized world. Because of his expertise, he also 
contributed to mapping out the direction of international emissions trading on the Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
8
 
2.1.2 US Acid Rain Program 
The sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) trading system under the framework of 
the Acid Rain Program of the 1990 Clean Air Act in the USA is a leading example of an 
emission trading system brought to life. This marked-based mechanism was initiated by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency
9
 in order to reduce the overall atmospheric 
level of the two chemicals above, which cause acid rain. The system would allow power 
plant operators, especially the coal industry and utilities, to buy, sell and trade credits to 
pollute as long as they cut overall emissions in half from the 1980 levels. Plants that missed 
the target faced stiff fines.
10
  
                                                 
6 The term Eco-Capitalists or Blue Greens is applied to those who espouse eco-capitalism. This can either be greens who 
accept or favor free market principles to achieve environmental aims or conservatives or liberals who espouse Green 
policies or, more generally, environmental concerns. 
7 Chicago Climate Exchange homepage, Staff - Richard L. Sandor, Ph.D., Dr. Sc.h.c; 
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/content.jsf?id=122  
8 How to Save the Planet and Make Money Doing It; Time Magazine online 20.04.2008: 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1732518,00.html (20 April 2008) 
9 US Environmental Protection Agency homepage: http://www.epa.gov/ 
10 US Environmental Protection Agency, Acid Rain Program, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/index.html  
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Trading of SO2 started in 1995 and NOx in 1999, and most of the investments are 
made in futures at The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). The emissions trading 
are now sourced out to “The Green Exchange”11 which was set up by the NYMEX and had 
its first trade in March 2008. The flexibility of the system has proven itself a success by 
lowering technological abatement costs compared to imposing strict regulations, and 
reducing SO2 and NOx emissions by 40% since 1990 levels and acid rain levels with 65% 
since 1976. Of that reason, the Acid Rain Program has emerged as a model for the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme of greenhouse gases and the California and other states‟ carbon 
trading rules are based on the same principles. The problematic part is that the technology 
did exist to control the components of acid rain without a huge cost. At this time, the author 
of this thesis cannot see that this is the case in the same magnitudes when it comes to 
greenhouse gases.  
On the other hand, one big lesson learned from the US Acid Rain Program is that 
stability and predictability are key factors in creating a successful emissions trading 
program, helping electric utilities and other emitters to prepare for the future. Another is that 
the rate of technological advance is indeed affected by public policy.
 12
 This will be further 
discussed in chapter 5. 
2.1.3 Carbon emissions and energy sources 
Leaving the Acid Rain Program and its politics aside, this chapter‟s focus will be greenhouse 
gases and the main industrial emitters of them.  
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) are simply said to be the gases present in the atmosphere 
which reduce the loss of heat into space and therefore contribute to global temperatures 
through the greenhouse effect. GHGs are fundamentally different from most other pollutants 
(SO2 for example) in that their effect on the Earth and its atmosphere is identical, regardless 
of where the emission takes place. The allegedly main GHG contributor, CO2, is also hard to 
categorize as a pollutant since it is fundamentally important and necessary for all organic life 
on Earth. Hence, this thesis will be cautious with the usage of the world “pollution” when it 
comes to GHGs. 
                                                 
11 The Green Exchange powered by NYMEX: http://www.greenfutures.com/  
12 'Cap-and-trade' model eyed for cutting greenhouse gases, San Francisco Chronicle online 2007-12-03, 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/12/03/MNMMTJUS1.DTL&hw. (December 3, 2007) 
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 Some of the technicalities behind GHGs like radiative forcing
13
 are complex and 
often raises controversy between research communities. A brief overview can be found at the 
official US Energy Information Administration (EIA)
14
. Hence, this thesis will not discuss 
this further but simply introduce some of the fundamentals behind the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme which is the IPCC/UNFCCC/Kyoto position presented in the introduction part of 
this thesis. The UNFCCC identified six GHGs and these gases are ranked in terms of an 
index that measures their global warming potential (GWP) relative to carbon dioxide. 1 
GWP is also called 1 CO2 equivalent unit (CO2e):
 15
 
Figure 2.1: Global Warming Potential of the six GHGs addressed by UNFCCC 
Greenhouse gas Global Warming Potential (GWP) 
Carbon dioxide (CO2)                     1 
Methane (CH4)                   23 
Nitrous Oxide (N2O)                 296 
Hydrofluorcarbons (HFCs)      12-12,000 
Perfluorcarbons (PFCs) 5,700-11,900 
Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)            22,200 
 
Furthermore, Figure 2.2
16
 below shows an overview of the annual GHG emissions by sector 
and the main GHGs in 2000. The top panel shows the percentage sum of all man-made 
greenhouse gases, weighted by their global warming potential. This consists of 72% carbon 
dioxide, 18% methane, 9% nitrous oxide and 1% other gases. The lower panels show the 
comparable information for each of these three primary greenhouse gases, with the same 
coloring of sectors as used in the top chart. Segments with less than 1% are not labeled. The 
largest emitters of GHGs are power stations (21.3%), industrial processes (16.8%) and 
transportation fuels (14%).  
                                                 
13 In climate science, radiative forcing is loosely defined as the change in net irradiance at the tropopause. "Net irradiance" 
is the difference between the incoming radiation energy and the outgoing radiation energy in a given climate system and is 
thus measured in Watts per square meter. Source: Myhre et al., New estimates of radiative forcing due to well mixed 
greenhouse gases, Geophysical Research Letters, Vol 25, No. 14, 1998 
14 What Are Greenhouse Gases?, Energy Information Administration, Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapter1.html 
15 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP/GRID-Arendal), 6.12.2 Direct GWPs, 
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/248.htm 
16 Figure: http://www.globalwarmingart.com/; Original data citation: Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research 
version 3.2, fast track 2000 project, http://www.mnp.nl/edgar/model/v32ft2000edgar/  
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Figure 2.3
17
 shows the global annual fossil fuel carbon emissions through year 2004, 
in million metric tons of carbon, as reported by the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis 
Center
18
. Note that it is carbon (C) and not carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions that are denoted 
in this figure. The general picture is however the same and current man-made GHG 
emissions are believed to be around 30 billion tons CO2e per year
19
, mainly from the 
combustion of fossil fuels. Natural sources of carbon dioxide include the respiration 
(breathing) of animals and plants, and evaporation from the oceans. Together, these natural 
sources release about 150 billion tons of carbon dioxide each year.
 20
 The rationale behind all 
this is that natural removal processes, such as photosynthesis by land and ocean-dwelling 
plant species, cannot keep pace with this extra input of man-made carbon dioxide, and 
consequently the gas is building up in the atmosphere. The increased concentration of GHGs 
will by complex measures not further discussed in this thesis lead to global warming and 
                                                 
17 Figure: http://www.globalwarmingart.com/; Original Data citation: "Marland, G., T.A. Boden, and R. J. Andres. 2007. 
Global, Regional, and National CO2 Emissions. In Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change. Carbon Dioxide 
Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, United States Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tenn., 
U.S.A." 
18 Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center homepage: http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/home.html  
19 Envisat makes first ever observation of regionally elevated CO2 from manmade emissions, The European Space Agency 
(ESA) news 2008-03-18, http://www.esa.int/esaEO/SEMZHVM5NDF_index_0.html (March 18, 2008) 
20 Manchester Metropolitan University. The Atmosphere, Climate & Environment (ACE) Information Programme 
homepage, “Greenhouse gas emissions”: http://www.ace.mmu.ac.uk/eae/GLobal_Warming/Older/Emissions.html  
Figure 2.2: Figure 2.3: 
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climate change in the longer run.
21
 By volume, the Earth‟s atmosphere contains roughly 
78.08% nitrogen, 20.95% oxygen, 0.93% argon, 0.0383% (383 ppm
22
) carbon dioxide, ~1% 
water vapor and 0.002% other gases. Although gases such as carbon dioxide and methane 
are minor constituents, the rationale behind the standpoint of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is that they are responsible for the greenhouse 
effect and thus exert a large influence on Earth‟s temperature.23 
Before finishing up this part, Figure 2.4
24
 on the next page presents a country-wise 
overview of where the GHG-emissions occur worldwide, where the areal proportions of the 
country reflects their total GHG-emissions.  Depicting the figure, emissions of carbon 
dioxide vary hugely between places, due to differences in lifestyle and ways of producing 
energy. The picture shows estimation that developed countries accounted for 52% of 
emissions, and the developing world for 48%.  
 
 
                                                 
21 CICERO, Bjerknessenteret and met.no, “Myter om klima” 2008-05-05: 
http://www.cicero.uio.no/webnews/index.aspx?id=10961 (Norwegian only) 
22 ppm: parts per million 
23 Window to the Universe website: 
http://www.windows.ucar.edu/tour/link=/earth/Atmosphere/chemistry_troposphere.html&edu=high  
24 Carbon Emissions 2000, Worldmapper.org, http://www.worldmapper.org/display.php?selected=295  
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Figure 2.5: Per capita GHG emissions by country in 2000 
Figure 2.4: Carbon Emissions 2000 
 
This is further illustrated by Figure 2.5
25
 which illustrates the per capita greenhouse gas 
emissions by country in 2000. 
 
                                                 
25 Made by Vinny Burgoo 2007-09-03, Data from the World Resources Institute's CAIT 4.0 database, http://cait.wri.org/  
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Figure 2.6: Link between GDP (PPP) and CO2 emissions per capita, 1999 
Given their respective populations, there is a much higher carbon intensity in the developed 
world which reflects the strong correlation of emissions with levels of industrialization and 
hence GDP. This is because of the energy usage a high GDP requires, which can be seen in 
Figure 2.6
26
 where GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing price parity (PPP), together with 
CO2 emissions per capita for 185 countries is plotted along an upward sloping line. 
 
 The last central insight in this section will be given by a world energy usage types bar graph 
depicted in Figure 2.7
27
 on the next page which presents a view of world energy sources in 
2006.  
                                                 
26 World Development Indicators, World Bank 2003, Data for 185 countries, year 1999. Taken from publicly available 
Gapminder World Environment Chart: http://www.gapminder.org/downloads/handouts/world-environment-chart.html  
27 Data from REN21, “2006 Global Status Report on Renewables”, 
http://www.ren21.net/globalstatusreport/download/RE_GSR_2006_Update.pdf  
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Figure 2.7: World energy usage 2006 An interesting fact (given 2 
% worldwide annual energy 
increase):  
A 20%  renewable energy 
sources (Bio, hydro, solar, 
wind, geo) goal worldwide 
in 2020 requires an 9 % 
annual renewable energy 
sources increase, 12% when 
excluding hydro and 24% 
when excluding biomass as 
well. 
2.1.4 UN, IPCC, UNFCCC & Kyoto Protocol 
The carbon market in the EU is a direct consequence of the Kyoto Protocol. The carbon 
market‟s sole mission is to place a cost on carbon emissions, a value on emission reductions, 
and to enable trade of the resulting allowances or credits. Simply put, the idea of carbon 
emissions trading through these establishments is that firms can either cut emissions or buy 
the right to keep polluting. There are four main mechanisms at play: 
I. International Emission Trading 
II. Clean Development Mechanism 
III. Joint Implementation 
IV. Regional/Domestic Emission Trading 
This section will discuss the essential background and establishment of the UN (United 
Nations) backed scientific body IPCC (The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 
the international environmental treaty UNFCCC (The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change) which led to the basis of today‟s compliance carbon 
markets – The Kyoto Protocol.  
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IPCC 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a scientific intergovernmental 
body and was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).  The motive was to provide decision-
makers and others interested in climate change with an objective source of information about 
the causes of climate change, its potential environmental and socio-economic consequences 
and the adaptation and mitigation options to respond to it. It is important to notice that the 
IPCC does not carry out research or monitor climate or related phenomena. The IPCC 
homepage states that the main activity of the IPCC is to publishing special reports on topics 
relevant to the implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) which will be more thoroughly discussed in the next paragraphs. The IPCC‟s 
constituency is made of the governments, the scientists and the people. Governments are all 
member countries of WMO and UNEP, the scientists are hundreds of scientists all over the 
world that contribute as authors, contributors and reviewers, and the people since it is a UN 
body working to promote the United Nations human development goals.
28
  
The IPCC published its first assessment report in 1990, a supplementary report in 
1992, a second assessment report (SAR) in 1995, a third assessment report (TAR) in 2001, 
and a fourth assessment report (AR4) was released in 2007. This thesis will not discuss all 
the findings of these reports since it is not required to understand the basis of this thesis. 
They are very often cited in popular literature and can easily be found on the IPCC 
homepage
29
. The most interesting insights from the AR4, and thus maybe also the future 
grounds for existing and future emissions markets, are the Special Report on Emissions 
Scenarios (SRES) which divides the associated changes in global-mean temperature until 
2100 in four main scenarios. In Figure 2.8, an economic focus implies a business-as-usual 
scenario with absence of any GHG abatement measures, while an environmental focus will 
divert economic growth into costly GHG abatement measures. The future world is 
furthermore split into a more globalized world or a more regionalized world.
30
  
                                                 
28 IPCC homepage, About IPCC: http://www.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm  
29 IPCC homepage, Reports: http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/index.htm  
30 IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, 4.2. SRES Scenario Taxonomy, 4.2.1. Storylines: 
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/091.htm#4.2.1  
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Figure 2.8: The four SRES in AR4 together with changes in global mean temperature at 
2090-99 relative to 1980-1999 
The AR4 suggests that in absence of any abatement of GHGs (A1 or A2 in Figure 
2.8), the projected concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will be from 700 to 
1,500ppm (from today‟s ~380ppm) by the end of the 21st century. According to the IPCC, 
this would lead to the potential global warming of 1.4ºC – 6.4ºC.31 Nevertheless, given the 
numerous uncertainties inherent in all attempts to model the future, it can never be clear 
from this what the „right‟ target for CO2 emissions reductions should be, either scientifically 
or economically. From this thesis‟ point of view, this would mean that any attempt to reach 
international agreements on how to best tackle the threats caused by climate change has to 
take account of these uncertainties and their political implications. This will not be further 
discussed at this point but serves as a guideline and introduction to the political difficulties 
that this topic comprises. 
The IPCC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 for “their efforts to build up 
and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change and to lay the 
foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change".
32
  
                                                 
31 IPCC, AR4 - Climate Change Synthesis report, p45: http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm   
32 IPCC homepage press release: http://www.ipcc.ch/press/index.htm#nobel  
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UNFCCC 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or FCCC) is an 
international environmental treaty produced and opened for signature at the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) conference in Rio de 
Janeiro (a.k.a. the Earth Summit). Its stated objective is “to achieve (…) stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” Initially, the treaty set no further goals 
but a voluntary "non-binding aim" to reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases 
that moreover should “be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to 
adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” 33 154 nations signed the 
treaty on June 12, 1992. Signatories to the UNFCCC are split in three groups and have 
different missions under the treaty. Annex I countries represent 40 of the world‟s 
industrialized countries and economies in transition, and the intention of the treaty was to 
stabilize their emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by the year 2000. Annex II 
countries‟ which are developed countries which pay for costs of developing countries, are a 
sub-group of Annex I that consists of all original OECD member countries plus the 
European Union.
34
 Developing countries have no immediate restrictions under the 
UNFCCC. The main initial reason for this was to avoid restrictions on growth because 
carbon emissions are strongly linked to industrial growth. Under the treaty, developing 
countries may volunteer to become Annex I countries when they are sufficiently developed. 
The signatory states of the UNFCCC were also split up into Annex B Countries which are 
the 39 emission-capped countries of the Protocol, and Annex II Countries which includes all 
original OECD member countries plus the EU. Lists of Annex I, II, B and Non-Annex I 
parties can be found in Appendix 1. 
 Since the UNFCCC entered into force in 1994, there have been held 13 UNFCCC 
annual Conferences of the Parties (COP) to assess progress in dealing with climate change. 
The COP-2 in Geneva, Switzerland (July, 1996) accepted the findings on climate change 
published by the IPCC and called for “legally binding mid-term targets”, and the definite 
                                                 
33 Article 2. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1353.php  
34 UNFCCC homepage: http://unfccc.int/not_assigned/b/items/1417.php  
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breakthrough came in Kyoto, Japan (December, 1997) when the Kyoto Protocol on Climate 
Change was adopted by COP-3 after intensive negotiations. Furthermore, the following 
Conferences of the Parties also negotiated the Kyoto Protocol (“the Protocol‟) to establish 
legally binding obligations for developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. 
This thesis will not deal with all the complex issues of the Protocol, but introduce 
some of the fundamentals that also served as the basis of the EU ETS. The major leap was 
that whereas the FCCC encouraged developed countries to stabilize GHG emissions, the 
Kyoto Protocol committed them to do so. And because it affects virtually all major sectors of 
the economy, the Protocol is considered to be the most far-reaching agreement on 
environment and sustainable development ever adopted.
 Most of the world‟s countries 
ratified the Protocol, but some nations as the United States chose not to. After the ratification 
by Russia, the Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005.  
The Protocol requires developed countries to reduce their GHG emissions and that 
these targets must be met within a five-year time frame between 2008 and 2012. This should 
add up to a total cut in GHG emissions of at least 5% against the baseline of 1990. As 
already mentioned, the parties of the Protocol are given a certain degree of flexibility in 
order to meet their emissions reduction targets. These mechanisms in the Protocol were 
developed on the COP-6 and COP-7 in 2001 and are Emissions Trading (International and 
regional/domestic), Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
35
 
The reason for this is that if Annex I countries cannot meet their emissions reduction target 
locally they must buy emission credits or invest in conservation so that the worldwide GHG 
reductions will be the same. JI is set forth in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol where any 
Annex I country can invest in emission reduction projects in any other Annex I country as an 
alternative to reducing emissions domestically and thus generate credits to cope with their 
Kyoto targets more cheaply. The CDM is a mechanism for similar project-based emission 
reduction activities in developing countries. The JI, unlike the CDM, takes place in countries 
which have an emission reduction requirement. The process of receiving credit from CDM 
and JI projects is somewhat complex and these mechanisms will be further discussed in 
chapter 2.2.4 about the EU ETS. The COP-13 in Bali, Indonesia (2007) agreed on a time 
lined negotiation on the post-2012 framework which is to be the Kyoto Protocol‟s 
                                                 
35 UNFCCC homepage, Kyoto Protocol: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php  
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successor.
36
 As an overarching goal, the UNFCCC concludes that since a stabilization of 
atmospheric concentration below 500ppm would be very difficult to achieve and would 
require abrupt abatement before 2020, the right balance should be around 550ppm as this 
should avoid the worst impacts of the high concentrations and is achievable over a 
reasonable time period. IPCC AR4 describes modeling studies that shows stabilization 
around 550ppm by 2100 is consistent with a global carbon price around €15-56/tCO2
e
 by 
2030.
37
 
2.1.5 Basic economics of emissions control 
Given that man-made GHG emissions can be seen as a negative impact on planet Earth in 
the long run and have to be mitigated, governments and other institutions in power can do 
this by a command-and-control approach of direct cuts or impose an emissions tax. In a 
command-and-control system with direct emission caps, carbon markets can be established 
in order to favor the most cost efficient abatement solutions. The effect of GHG emissions is 
a classic example of negative externalities, which is explained by the negative effects of 
production and consumption activities not directly reflected in the market price.
38
 Since the 
debate has mostly been circulating around the relative advantages on price versus quantity 
instruments, this part of the thesis will now introduce some of the economics behind the 
ways of correcting this market failure and putting a market price on the social costs caused 
by a damage-causing emission. The inspiration of the following textbook examples is taken 
from Microeconomics, 5
th
 ed. (2001) by Pindyck and Rubinfeld.
39
 Necessary assumptions 
and adjustments for the sake of the topic in question will be made. GHGs will throughout 
this chapter be referred to as carbon emissions which can be interpreted as a carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2e) as introduced in Chapter 2.1.3. 
To remedy the externalities caused by production if the firm that generates the 
externality has a fixed-proportions production technology, one simply has to encourage the 
                                                 
36 UNFCCC homepage, The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php  
37 IPCC, AR4 - Climate Change Synthesis report, p59: http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm 
38 Pindyck, Robert S. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L (2001); Microeconomics. 5th ed. (In Chapter 18: Information, Market Failure 
and the Role of Government, p621-634). Prentice Hall International, Inc. 
39 Pindyck, Robert S. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L (2001); Microeconomics. 5th ed. (In Chapter 18.2: Ways of Correcting 
Market Failure, p625-634). Prentice Hall International, Inc. 
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Figure 2.9: The efficient level of emissions, standard and fees (tax) 
firm to produce less. This is a standpoint of many environmental institutions when it comes 
to carbon emissions because e.g. less energy usage causes less carbon emissions. However, 
most utilities can substitute among inputs in the production process by altering their choices 
of technology either in the short or the long run. In these examples, Marginal Social Cost 
(MSC) is the sum of the marginal cost of production and the marginal external cost, while 
the Marginal Cost of Abatement (MCA) measures the additional cost to the firm of installing 
pollution control equipment. The MSC curve is upward sloping because the marginal cost of 
more carbon emissions (i.e. production) is believed to be higher the more extensive it is. This 
is nevertheless a widely debated topic because the social costs of carbon emissions lies in the 
future and is not yet known. In addition, since these are the social costs of future generations, 
we have to consider the future generations‟ adaptation of a changed climate and their 
increased wealth caused by industrial development and thus more carbon emissions. This has 
also been one of the main criticisms of the Stern Review
40
, especially by William Nordhaus 
in his article addressing the Economics of Climate Change.
41
 This will not be further 
discussed here, and an assumption of an upward sloping and constant MSC curve will be 
made. 
 
                                                 
40 HM Treasury homepage: Stern Review on the economics of climate change. http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm  
41 Nordhaus, W. (2007); The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, May 3, 2007. 
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 The MCA curve is downwards sloping because the marginal cost of reducing 
emissions is low when the reduction has been slight and high when it has been substantial. A 
slight reduction can be made from smaller efficiency improvements and fuel switching e.g. 
from lignite to cleaner coal in power stations. Large reductions will require costly changes in 
the production process and the technology used. No emissions will require no production 
and is has thus an unlimited unknown cost, e.g. bankruptcy.  
Because emissions reduction is costly and offers no direct benefit to the firm, the 
firm‟s profit-maximizing level of emissions in Figure 2.9, is E, the level at which the 
marginal cost of abatement is zero and level of emissions are high. The efficient level of 
emissions is at point E* where the marginal social cost of emissions, P*, is equal to the 
marginal cost of abating emissions. If emissions are lower than E*, the marginal cost of 
abating emissions is greater than the marginal social cost and emissions are too low relative 
to the social optimum. On the other hand, if the level of emissions is larger than E*, the 
marginal social cost is greater than the marginal benefit and emissions are then too high. 
From the theory, the firm can be encouraged to reduce emissions to E* by setting emissions 
standards (a cap) or introducing emissions fees (a tax). It is also possible to introduce 
transferable emissions permits which are tradable units similar to emissions trading. To get a 
good introduction of the theory, the two first ones will be dealt with in this section, while the 
economics behind emissions trading will be discussed in the next sub-chapter.   
 An emissions standard, or a cap, is a legal limit on how much emissions a firm can 
emit. If the firm exceeds the limit, it can face monetary and even criminal penalties. In 
Figure 2.9, the efficient emission standard is at point E*, and the firm will be heavily 
penalized for emissions exceeding this level. If the firm meets the standard by shifting 
production or installing abatement equipment, the total costs will be area 2 under the MCA 
line in Figure 2.9. In this isolated world, the firm‟s average cost curve will rise by the 
average cost of abatement and firms will find it profitable to enter the industry only if the 
price of the product is greater than the average cost of production plus abatement. The 
increase is believed to be equal to the average cost of abatement in the EU which is the 
carbon emissions price. 
 An emissions fee, or a tax, is a charge levied on each unit of a firm‟s emissions. In 
Figure 2.9, a tax of P* will generate efficient behavior by the firm. The firm will pay a total 
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Figure 2.10: Examples of standards (caps) and fees (tax) 
fee given by area 1 in Figure 2.9 and incur a total abatement cost given by area 2. This cost 
is less than the fee the firm would pay if it did not reduce emissions at all. 
 It is evident that it is impossible for the policymaker to have perfect information 
about the MSC and MCA curves. There are important differences between standards and 
fees when the policymaker has incomplete information and when it is costly to regulate 
firms‟ emissions. The next paragraphs will explore these differences with two examples, so 
let us suppose that the institution in power must charge the same fee or set the same standard 
for all firms. 
 
 Firstly, consider the two firms in Figure 2.10 (a) that have different abatement costs 
and thus different MCA curves. The MSC curves are the same and left out from this graph 
since carbon emissions is causing the same problems wherever they are occurring. MCA1 
and MCA2 represent the marginal cost of abatement curves for the two firms. Each firm 
initially generates E emissions, and the government wants to reduce total emissions to E* in 
total for both firms. Figure 2.10 (a) shows that the cheapest way to do this would be to have 
Firm 2 to reduce its emissions to E2 and Firm 1 to E1 which would add up to a total of E* for 
both firms. If the government was to impose a cap on both firms to E*, the MCA of Firm 2 
increases from P* to P2 and the MCA of Firm 1 decreases from P* to P1. Because P2 - P* > 
P* - P1, this cannot be cost-minimizing when the first firm can reduce emissions more 
cheaply than the first. This can be seen from the green and yellow areas in Figure 2.10 (a) 
where Firm 2 incurs additional abatement costs given by the green-dashed area and Firm 1 
enjoys reduced abatement costs given by the yellow-dashed area. The added abatement costs 
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to Firm 2 are clearly larger than the reduced costs of Firm 1. A fee or a tax of P* might thus 
be preferable to a standard of E* because we will get the efficient outcome given above.  
 Secondly, consider Figure 2.10 (b) where the MSC curve is set very steep and the 
MCA curve relatively flat for the sake of the example. The efficient emission fee is P*, but 
because of limited information a lower fee of PL is set by the institution in power. Because 
the MCA curve is flat, the firm‟s emissions will be increased from E* to EPL units. The 
increase in social costs less the decrease in the firm‟s abatement costs is given by area 1 + 2. 
If a similar percentage error is made when setting a cap, i.e. a higher level of emissions 
allowed from E* to EH, the increase in social costs less the decrease in abatement costs will 
be the triangle given by area 1, which is far smaller than the one before. Hence, a standard 
might be preferable in this situation. 
 To conclude, when no emissions units are traded, taxes offer certainty about the costs 
of abatement but leave the reduction of emissions levels uncertain. Taxes also give a certain 
flexibility since it can be imposed directly on the producer or indirectly on the consumer. 
With incomplete information, caps offer more certainty about emissions levels but leave the 
costs of abatement uncertain. The preferable policy will depend on the shapes of the cost 
curves and hence the amount of information available. 
  A third system, and the core of this thesis, is mentioned in the theory from Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld: Transferable Emissions Permits which is a system of marketable permits, 
allocated among firms, specifying the maximum level of emissions that can be generated. 
This is very much like the “cap-and-trade” system we have seen in chapter 2.1.2 about the 
US Acid Rain Program and the EU ETS, or a “baseline-and-credit” system used in e.g. the 
New South Wales Abatement Scheme in Australia presented in Ch. 2.2.4.2 or the Joint 
Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
system works so that each firm must have permits or carbon credits to generate emissions 
and the credits can be bought and sold on a market. In Figure 2.10 (a), Firm 2 could buy 
carbon credits from Firm 1 for a price up to P2 and thus make the allocation more efficient. If 
there are enough firms and credits, a competitive market for credits will develop, and in 
market equilibrium, the price of a credit equals the marginal cost of abatement for all firms. 
In this way, marketable emissions credits create a market for externalities. The institution(s) 
in power determines the total number of credits available and thus the total amount of 
emissions. This reflects the system with standards (caps), but the marketability of the credits 
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allows pollution abatement to be achieved at a minimum cost, just as a system of fees (taxes) 
would do.  
 Some parties in the debate between taxes or an emissions trading program are 
concerned with the cost of the cap-and-trade policy, and have thus introduced an additional 
“safety valve” instrument which can be seen as a hybrid between the price and quantity 
instruments. The system provides a guaranteed emissions allowance price and the 
government will print new credits for sale at this specified price to companies in need, 
potentially in an unlimited quantity. Emitters have the choice of either obtaining permits in 
the marketplace or purchasing them from the government at a specified trigger price which 
can be adjusted over time. By setting the trigger price high enough, or the number of 
allowances low enough, the safety valve can be used to mimic either a pure quantity or a 
pure price mechanism since it gives the governments to tame an overly stringent emissions 
target or control unreasonable price volatility. They way of implementing this all comes 
down to the new information in hand.
42
  
 As mentioned above, a distinction is generally drawn between regulated command-
and-control as cap-and-trade systems and baseline-and-credits systems. Both trade with 
emission permits or allowances and consist of an absolute level of emissions which can 
increase or decrease over time. Thus, the emissions baseline in a credit scheme can be 
identical to the emissions cap in an allowance scheme. However, a baseline-and-credit 
program can also exist of baselines that are not emission limits but simply GHG per capita or 
GDP. Any emissions reductions below an agreed baseline are referred to as emissions credits 
and only those emissions credits can be traded. Furthermore, a set of emission producers that 
are not under an aggregate cap can create credits by reducing their emissions below a 
baseline level of emissions so that these credits can be purchased by polluters that do have a 
regulatory limit. Cap-and-trade schemes require an extensive regulatory involvement and 
hence effort at the beginning to set them up, while baseline-and-credit schemes require less 
initial design effort, but baselines need to be determined on a project-by-project basis and 
individual trades must be certified by the regulator. Both approaches have their advantages 
and disadvantages, and there is considerable dispute about which system is more efficient 
                                                 
42 Jacoby, D.H. & Ellerman, A.D., The safety valve and climate policy. (In: Energy Policy, Vol 32, Issue 4, March 2004, p 
481-491)  
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and hence more desirable.
43
 Generally, the cap-and-trade system has been viewed as more 
efficient and effective and many of the criticisms of emissions trading seem to be targeted at 
baseline-and-credit rather than cap-and-trade schemes. The next chapter will thus introduce 
an economics example of the rationale behind emissions trading with cap-and-trade without 
a safety valve, e.g. the EU ETS. 
2.1.6 Economics of international emissions trading 
This section will elaborate on the last section and present a straightforward example of the 
economics of emissions trading where two countries are participating in a cap-and-trade 
scheme such as the EU ETS. The rationale behind the emissions trading called cap-and-trade 
is that the institutional power sets a limit on the economic area's total carbon output and then 
issues permits or allowances to companies. Companies that emit more than they have 
allowances for have to buy more or face stiff fines. Companies that emit less could sell the 
extras. In theory, the market would find the most efficient way to meet emissions standards, 
which the government would tighten over time. Another big question in relation to this is the 
distribution method of allowances, i.e. if they should be given away or auctioned to firms. 
This will be addressed in Chapter 2.2.1.1 about the EU ETS.  
 The following example is popular and constitutes a simple overview of the 
economics of international emissions trading. This example is not only valid on a national 
level, but it could be between two firms or even two subsidiaries in the same company as 
well. Consider two countries in Figure 2.11 below, Germany and Sweden, where the 
marginal cost of abatement (MCA) is higher in Sweden (MCAS) than in Germany (MCAG). 
The X-axis is inverted from the previous two figures in last chapter and is now showing the 
emissions reductions and not total emissions. Hence, the MCA curve is upward sloping 
because the marginal cost of reducing emissions assumed to be low when the reduction has 
been slight and high when it has been substantial.  
 
                                                 
43 Environmental Finance homepage, Features, April 2000 – Kyoto Protocol: http://www.environmental-
finance.com/2000/featapr2.htm  
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Figure 2.11: International emissions trading example 
The required cap and reduction RReq for each country is set by the institution in power, 
e.g. the EU, and each country can either reduce all the required amount of emissions by itself 
or it can choose to buy or sell in the market. P is the market price for carbon allowances. 
Germany can however abate its required amount at a marginal price of PG < P, and it has the 
potential to profit if it abates more emissions than required internally. On the other side, 
Sweden can abate the required amount only at a price of PS which is quite higher than the 
market price P. Thus, Sweden has the potential to profit if it abates fewer emissions than 
required internally and instead buys allowances for abatements elsewhere.  
Through international emissions trading, created precisely to exploit different MCAs, 
Sweden would abate emissions until MCAS intersects with P at R* and buy emissions 
allowances from Germany for the price of P to fill up its required reduction quota. Sweden 
will have total abatement costs equal to the yellow-dashed area and its gains from trade 
would be the green-dashed area (d, e, f), reflecting the cost of purchasing RReq – R* at a price 
(R*, RReq, d, e) from Germany and saving the costs of internal abatement in area (R*, RReq, f, 
e) at the same time. Germany sells R* - RReq to Sweden at a unit price P while spending less 
than P on abatement. Germany‟s gains from trade will be the green-dashed area (a, b, c) 
since it spends less (RReq, R*, b, c) on internal abatements and earns more (RReq, R*, b, a) on 
selling. The two R* represent the efficient allocations that arise from participating in 
emissions trading. 
 29 
2.2 Existing markets of carbon emissions  
This chapter will present the application of the economic theory presented in the previous 
section in today‟s existing carbon emissions markets. It is however not clear-cut for policy 
makers to utilize this theory because of the massive lack of perfect information about 
abatement costs and when it comes to political values and interests such as how to address 
the threats posed by climate change, and the rationality behind the cost of mitigating GHGs 
worldwide. One GHG can for example be far cheaper to mitigate than another both with 
regards to technology and geographical location. Today, various emission trading schemes 
exist inside and outside the scope of the Kyoto Protocol. This thesis finds it paramount to 
distinguish between compliance or regulated markets like the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the various voluntary markets like the California Climate 
Change Register (CCCR). Basically, compliance markets are governed by an institutional 
power to generate demand, while voluntary markets are made for philanthropic and 
marketing reasons with currently no legally mandated reduction to guarantee demand.
44
 This 
chapter will firstly introduce the existing and planned compliance markets, with focus on EU 
ETS, and secondly give a brief introduction to the various voluntary markets. 
2.2.1 Compliance (regulated) markets 
As previously stated, the only existent functioning cap-and-trade compliance carbon 
emissions market at the time of writing is the European Union GHG Emissions Trading 
Scheme. All together, the following compliance schemes have been/are effective or are 
being developed, using either cap-and-trade, baseline-and-credit or a mix
45
: 
Name Type Periods 
European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) Cap-and-trade 2005-7 
2008-12, 
2013- ? 
New South Wales (NSW) GHG Abatement Scheme 
(GGAS) in Australia 
Baseline-and-credit 2003-? 
New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZITS) Cap-and-trade & 
Baseline-and-credit 
2013-? 
Canadian Emissions Trading Scheme (C ETS) Baseline-and-credit 2010-? 
                                                 
44 Bayon, Ricardo et.al. (2007): Voluntary Carbon Markets: A Business Guide to What They Are and How They Work. 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. 
45 IETA homepage, Introduction to Domestic Emission Trading Schemes: 
http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/index.php?IdSiteTree=85  
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2.2.1.1   European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS)  
The European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) commenced 
operation in January 2005 as the largest multi-country, multi-sector carbon emission trading 
scheme world-wide in conjunction with the Kyoto Protocol.
46
 The first phase was a 
“mandatory warm-up” and ran from January 2005 to December 2007, while the second 
phase is the mandatory Kyoto phase lasting five years from 2008-12. A third one, Phase III, 
will start in 2013 and allegedly last until 2020. The background for the third phase is The 
Integrated Energy and Climate change package from January 2007
47
, endorsed by the 
European Council in March 2007, where Member States agreed to reduce the EU's 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20% in 2020 compared to 1990 levels by increasing 
energy efficiency by 20% and increase the share of renewable energy to at least 20% by 
2020.
48
 
 In phase I and II, the scheme is mandatory for sectors listed in Annex I and covers 
almost half of the CO2 emissions in the 27 Member States of the EU plus Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway, from over 11,500 energy-intensive installations such as 
combustion and power plants, oil refineries and other carbon intensive factories.
49
 The 
scheme may however be expanded to include other gases than CO2 in the future.
50
  
The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system, and National Allocation Plans (NAPs) are 
central in the determination of the number of allowances available. The NAPs fix the total 
quantity of CO2 emissions that Member States grant to their companies, which can then be 
sold or bought internationally by the companies themselves. As the theory presented, by 
placing a cap on the total number of emission allowances, NAPs create the scarcity needed 
for a functioning market in allowances to develop, and in turn enables companies to limit or 
                                                 
46 European Commission homepage, Environment, Climate Change: Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission.htm  
47 European Commission homepage, Environment, Climate Change: The EU's Contribution to Shaping A Future Global 
Climate Change Regime, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/future_action.htm  
48 European Commission homepage, Environment, Climate Change: EU ETS post 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/ets_post2012_en.htm  
49 European Commission homepage, Press releases: Q&A on Emissions Trading and National Allocation Plans, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/84&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLan
guage=en  
50 IETA homepage, EU ETS: http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/index.php?IdSitePage=389  
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reduce their emissions at least cost. Member States must ex-ante decide on how many 
allowances to allocate in total for the trading period and how many to grant to their 
installations. It is also mandatory for each Member State to have a national registry to ensure 
accurate accounting of all units available and traded.
51
 NAPs can be checked, rejected, 
adjusted and confirmed by the European Commission in dialogue with the Member States. 
The European Commission has the final say and is required to assess each NAP for 
compatibility with the criteria set out in the directives and with the EC Treaty.
52
 The 
companies are responsible for monitoring and reporting emissions and reports to Member 
States and the Commission, which keeps electronic registries to track allowances and where 
emissions reports will be subject to independent verification. The CO2-producing 
installations in the Member States are required annually to surrender emission allowances 
equal to their emissions in the previous year before April 30
th
. So before April 30
th
, 2008 a 
company has to surrender the allowances that match the emissions for the year 2007 and so 
on.
53
 This is called „surrendering‟ of allowances, and for every ton of emissions that is not 
covered by an allowance a company will have to pay a penalty of €40 in the first phase and 
€100 thereafter. Borrowing or banking of allowances within the years of the period is 
allowed.
54
 
Free allocation vs. auctioning of allowances 
Since the EU Member States are in charge of allocating allowances to installations, 
the allocation methods will be and have been a serious question of debate. There are two 
practices; whether to allocate them directly by giving them away, also called grandfathering, 
or to allocate them by auctioning. This is an important, albeit not dominant, theme of this 
thesis because the political decision of the choice of mix between these two will affect the 
pricing and volatility of EU allowances. There could have been written an entire thesis on 
this topic alone, and the following discussion is brief and will only reflect the theory and 
debate headlines. 
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Grandfathering comes from the “grandfather clause” which is an exception that 
allows an old rule to continue to apply to some existing situations, when a new rule will 
apply to all future situations. When a new regime with emissions allowances comes into 
practice in the EU, the old power plants and industrial factories will be exempted and 
granted them for free. Since firms can abate emissions and sell allowances at market price or 
use them, the price of their products, e.g. electrical power, increases with the average market 
price for allowances. The market price is settled by the supply (number of allowances 
available in the system) and demand (cost of average CO2 abatement). This has been the 
practice in most Member States and led to a windfall of firm profits, because giving 
allowances out for free rather than selling them does not change the underlying dynamics of 
price increases for consumers. This was also acknowledged by the European Commission in 
their statement that “…an allocation approach that gives all allowances for free to directly 
affected industries will have the overall effect of transferring some wealth from the broad 
public (in this case consumers) to those industries.”55  
Auctioning of allowances was adopted during phase I by four EU countries; 
Denmark, Ireland, Hungary and Lithuania. From the original EU ETS Directive, 
governments could auction up to 5% in phase I and up to 10% in phase II. A research article 
by Hepburn et al.
56
 regarding the auctioning of EU ETS phase II allowances provides several 
points about the pros and cons of auctioning allowances. The technicalities of the auctioning 
itself are also thoroughly discussed, but will not be addressed here. One main insight is since 
abatement measures might increase the operating costs of companies, free allocation is 
essentially a one-off subsidy that helps companies maintain a good profit in the face of the 
higher operating costs in the short term. Auctioning, on the other hand, reduces the scale of 
that subsidy. However, free allocation or auctioning is concluded to not change 
competitiveness in the longer term. Another main insight is that auctioning of allowances 
can be used to dampen price volatility and offers the prospect of supporting a long-term 
price signal to aid investor confidence. It is also argued that auctioning will provide funds 
which the allocator can use for efficiency, rebates or other related subsidies.   
                                                 
55 Williams-Derry, C., de Place, E., Why Free Allocation of Carbon Allowances Means Windfall  Profits for Energy 
Companies at the Expense of Consumers (February 2008), Sightline Institute: 
http://www.sightline.org/research/energy/res_pubs/windfalls/windfalls  
56 Hepburn, Cameron et al., Auctioning of EU ETS phase II allowances: how and why?: www.climatepolicy.com  
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Linking with the market mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol 
 The EU ETS is linked with the Kyoto Protocol‟s flexible mechanisms Joint 
Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). These were briefly 
introduced under “UNFCCC” in Chapter 2.1.4, and will be further presented in this section. 
Linking EU ETS with the Kyoto Protocol implies a bridge between two different 
frameworks. The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system while the JI/CDM of the Kyoto Protocol 
can be seen as a baseline-and-credit system where you generate credits from the emissions 
abated through a project. The most common projects are within energy efficiency, fuel 
switches, renewables and reduction of gases with a high GWP (see Figure 2.1) in factories. 
Furthermore, the units traded (this will be addressed in Chapter 3.2) and the regulatory 
context and institutions involved are different. While JI-projects can be within the EU 
(Annex I) countries, the CDM is only for projects in developing countries.  
 The CDM is considerably larger than the JI with 1,510 million units expected to be 
issued and available to trade until 2012 compared to JI‟s 250 million today‟s date.57 While 
the global carbon market was worth €40 billion in 2007, the CDM market alone was worth 
€12 billion – an astounding 200% increase in value terms from 2006 and thus the secondary 
trading of CDM credits became the fastest growing segment within the carbon markets.
58
 
The largest host country for CDM-projects in 2007 was by far China with 62% of the 
relative share, followed by Indonesia, Brazil, India and Mexico together accounting for a 
relative share of 27%. The largest buyers in 2007 were UK (48%), Japan (15%) and 
Luxembourg (11%).
59
 The reason for UK and Luxembourg‟s share is that the largest CDM 
buyers are private firms or banks in these locations that are willing to take on uncertainty and 
invest in these relatively risky projects. Eager Western bankers have spent billions of dollars 
capturing GHG gases, improving energy efficiency and building wind farms in developing 
countries to gain a first-mover advantage of this increasing market. The EU ETS is believed 
to account for 80% of all international GHG emissions trading, while Japan is believed to 
account for almost 10% through its investments in CDM-projects.
60
 All CDM-projects have 
                                                 
57 UNEP Risø Centre homepage: http://cdmpipeline.org/  
58 Point Carbon, “Carbon 2008 – Post-2012 is now”, 2008-03-11. www.pointcarbon.com  
59 UNEP Risø Centre homepage, CDM pipeline analysis: http://cdmpipeline.org/publications/CDMpipeline.xls  
60 TSE Eyes Carbon Trading from 2009: Japan Corporate News online 2008-05-19: 
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to be carefully planned, registered and scrutinized by an independent firm, the local 
governments and finally the UNFCCC. This can require substantial upfront investments in a 
developing country. The supervising power, CDM Executive Board of the UNFCCC, is 
responsible for finally issuing the certified emissions reductions. The issuance of credits 
from CDM-projects first started to pick up in early 2006.
61
  
A condition for the issue of credits in these projects in respect of the reductions 
achieved is that the projects result in real, measurable and long-term climate change benefits. 
All CDM projects must meet three key criteria. Firstly, the project must satisfy the criterion 
of encouraging sustainable development, whereby the host developing country gets access to 
more efficient technology than it otherwise would have. Secondly, the project must be 
additional to best practice in the relevant industry sector of the host country so that the 
emissions reductions are additional to those that otherwise would occur. I.e. the planned 
reductions would not occur without the additional monetary incentive provided by emission 
reductions credits. Thirdly, the project must be supplemental to that developing country‟s 
existing policy measures.
62
 Although the CDM is widely debated, the reason for these 
criteria is to give developing countries the opportunity to benefit from the transfer of 
technology, knowledge and expertise in accordance with the concept of sustainable 
development. Nonetheless, some critics argue that the scale of the investment has remained 
grossly insufficient and that the scheme gives poor countries a reason to avoid any sort of 
„climate-friendly‟ regulation. Why spend money when someone else will pay you to do it?63 
These are of course huge challenges that could be argued to create a „false market‟ for these 
credits. This is thus another important aspect of the political challenge this market faces. 
The linking itself works through a conversion of JI/CDM credits into EU ETS 
allowances in order to maintain a single currency within the EU ETS. Participants in EU 
ETS can buy JI/CDM credits, deliver them to the national authority and get issued an 
allowance in exchange of it. This increases supply and is an important price signal. Hence, 
there will be a limit of the amount of JI/CDM credits that can be allowed into the EU ETS: 
As soon as JI/CDM credits amounting to 6% of initially allocated allowances for the trading 
                                                 
61 UNFCCC homepage of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): http://cdm.unfccc.int/  
62 The Kyoto Protocol, Article 12: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php  
63 The Economist 2008-06-07, “Climate change: A convenient truth, sadly ignored”, p14-15 
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period have been converted, the European Commission must undertake a review and 
consider placing a limit on the credits that can be converted during the remainder of the 
trading period. Appendix 1 provides a Member State overview of the already set JI/CDM 
targets. Problems with linking the UNFCCCs International Transaction Log (ITL) with the 
EU counterpart, Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) have however caused 
some delays in the availability of credits from the CDM system.
64
 Furthermore, the EU has 
indicated willingness to link the EU ETS to trading schemes in other countries that have 
ratified the Kyoto protocol as well, but the results of this is still too early to say something 
about since the regulations and compliance of other schemes vary too much. The EU ETS 
and Kyoto Protocol do for example not allow credits from nuclear projects or “carbon sinks” 
such as planting forests to absorb CO2.
65
  
2.2.1.2   Other compliance emissions trading schemes 
There are a number of other compliance schemes already working and under way around the 
world. Some of them are still at the idea and planning stage, but might very well be 
operational within a few years. Some of the most recognized ones are the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the US, New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
Scheme (NSW GGAS) in Australia, New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZITS) and 
the Canadian Emissions Trading Scheme.
66
  
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was established in April 2003 as 
a cooperative effort by a number of Northeast and Mid-Atlantic US states
67
 to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions in the region. The RGGI‟s goal is the design of a regional, multi-state cap-
and-trade program initially covering carbon dioxide emissions from power plants in the 
region and then expanding the program to other kinds of sources. The scheme will 
commence with its initial features in 2009 and it will be the first compliance cap-and-trade 
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65 European Commission homepage, Press releases: Q&A Kyoto Protocol: 
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scheme in the US.
68
 Most states have pledged full or close to full auctioning of the 
allowances, and a secondary market in which allowances are traded between compliance 
buyers, financials, and others are expected to emerge after the auctions.
69
 
The NSW GGAS commenced on January 1
st
, 2003 and was one of the first 
mandatory GHG emissions trading schemes in the world. Although not universal or close to 
the industrial coverage of the EU ETS, the scheme aims to reduce GHG emissions associated 
with the production and use of electricity and all the six GHGs in Figure 2.1 are covered. 
This is a baseline-and-credit scheme and electricity producers have a benchmark obligation 
assigned to their operation and can achieve their targets by offsetting their liability with 
credits created from renewable energy and low emission generation, tree planting and energy 
efficiency. Although the fines of not complying have been AU$12.00 (~€7.30) and only a 
fraction of the GHG emissions of the area is covered, the scheme has been considered such a 
success that the NSW government announced it would extend the program from its current 
end date of 2012 to 2020. If the national politics change, however, NSW GGAS is planned 
to end and join the proposed National Emissions Trading Scheme of Australia of 2010.
70
 
 Meanwhile, New Zealand and Canada are working on compliance emissions trading 
schemes as well. The NZITS early stages started with a Climate Change Response Act in 
2002 and The Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill of the 
NZ parliament in December 2007.
71
 The plan is to introduce a cap-and-trade greenhouse gas 
emissions trading scheme in 2013 covering all sectors and all gases, linking it with baseline-
and-credit schemes such as the CDM and no absolute limit on domestic emissions. Carbon 
sinks will also be allowed.
72
 The Canadian Government is working towards tough goals 
such as an emission-intensity reduction of 33% from 2006 levels in 2020. The period should 
start in 2010 and a variety of compliance mechanisms are put forward. Although not stated, 
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it is looking like a baseline-and-credit system where firms can obtain credits by domestic 
abatement and trading, investing in technology funds that are promoting GHG reducing 
technologies, offset systems from other projects such as carbon sinks, being rewarded a one-
time credit for early action and use the CDM with 10% of total target.
73
 
2.2.2 Voluntary markets 
The ideas behind voluntary markets are mainly those behind compliance markets and the 
markets have a lot of the same characters when it comes to functionality and products traded. 
It can be argued that the voluntary markets try to resemble the compliance markets. Still, 
where compliance markets are strictly run by the government or other institutional powers 
and can protect the system with fines, voluntary carbon markets are largely unregulated and 
made for philanthropic and marketing reasons with currently no legally mandated reduction 
to guarantee demand.  There are however situations where governments are interfering in 
voluntary markets, providing subsidies and even setting them up.
74
 A good site of 
information about voluntary carbon markets is “Ecosystem Marketplace” by The Katoomba 
Group.
75
 The site has gathered information from a number of clearing houses and valued the 
international over-the-counter (OTC) market at €210 million in 2007. The voluntary carbon 
markets are therefore dwarfed to 0.5% of the compliance markets‟ capitalization of €40 
billion in 2007. One of the reasons is the average voluntary CO2e offset price of about €4.00 
compared to the average price of 2008-12 EU allowances of €19.60 during the same year.76 
At the same time, the range of voluntary carbon credits was €1.10 - €190 while the EU 
allowances were €12.25 – €25.15 in 2007. This explains the less mature and stabile nature of 
the voluntary markets. Because of the relatively small, uncertain and immature market for 
voluntary carbon credits, albeit argued as important by market players, this thesis will not 
discuss the background further. The next section will shortly introduce some of the most 
famous voluntary carbon emissions schemes and collaborations in order to get a sense of the 
way they work. The quantitative reduction targets and other numbers are will be avoided. 
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The United Kingdom Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS) was a pilot project 
prior to the EU ETS and a voluntary emissions trading system which started in April 2002 
and closed in 2006. It was the first cross-industry, national GHG ETS in the world. 
Companies could choose to enter the scheme through a timed auction as a direct participant 
with absolute targets or caps, or though the Climate Change Levy Agreement which was an 
energy tax where companies could get a discount on the tax if they chose to make reductions 
through participation in the trading scheme.
 77
 The UK ETS thus allowed government and 
corporate early movers and to gain experience in the auction process and the trading system 
that the later schemes such as the EU ETS have entailed.  
Japan commenced their voluntary emissions trading scheme in April 2006 with a 
CO2 emissions quota trading system for 34 selected companies and corporate groups with 
national reduction targets similar to those in the Kyoto Protocol.
78
 The system works more 
like a fund where the ministry subsidizes the installation cost of GHG emissions reduction 
equipment to help businesses that are actively attempting to reduce GHG emissions. In 
exchange for the subsidy, the participants are required to commit to a certain reduction in 
their GHG emissions. The scheme also allows them to trade GHG emission quotas to meet 
their reduction targets, e.g. through the CDM.
79
 Today, the Tokyo Stock Exchange Group 
Inc is exploring the possibilities of establishing a carbon emissions trading market in Japan 
by 2009.
80
  
The US has some of the most complex and well-established voluntary markets and 
collaborations for GHG reductions. The Chicago Climate Exchange® (CCX®) is a self-
regulatory exchange that administers the world's first multi-national and multi-sector 
marketplace for reducing and trading GHG emissions.
81
 It commenced in 2003 with a legally 
binding integrated trading system to reduce emissions of all six major GHGs with offset 
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projects worldwide. The CCX members make a voluntary but legally binding commitment to 
meet annual GHG emission reduction targets. The founder, chairman and CEO of CCX is 
Richard L. Sandor who previously in this thesis was introduced as the “father of emissions 
trading”. The CCX provides independent, third party verifications of reductions and offers 
their members to gain leadership recognition for taking early, credible and binding action to 
address climate change.
82
 
The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) is a collaboration between states or 
provinces of the western US, Canada and Mexico established in order to develop regional 
strategies to address climate change. WCI is identifying, evaluating and implementing 
collective and cooperative ways to reduce greenhouse gases in the region such as to develop 
a market-based, multi-sector mechanism to help achieve a GHG reduction goal. The partners 
will complete a design of a voluntary market-based mechanism in August 2008.
83
 
The California Climate Action Registry was established in 2001 by California 
statute as a non-profit voluntary registry which tracks and registers voluntary projects that 
reduce GHG emissions. The purpose is help companies and organizations with operations in 
the state to establish GHG emissions baselines against which any future GHG emission 
reduction requirements may be applied. The registry basically encourages voluntary actions 
to increase energy efficiency and reduce GHG emissions.
84
 The sister organization, The 
Climate Registry, was set up in 2007 as a non-profit partnership that serves all of North 
America in the same way.
85
 The Climate Registry for example manages The Midwestern 
Greenhouse Gas Accord, which is a regional agreement by six governors of states of the 
US Midwest. The Accord‟s goals are to reduce GHG emissions, to develop a market-based 
and multi-sector cap-and-trade mechanism to help achieve those reduction targets and to 
create a regional transportation and storage infrastructure for CO2 emissions.
86
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3. The trading 
This part of the thesis will move on to more practical parts of carbon emissions markets, 
namely the trading, with a main focus on the EU ETS. This part will move away from the 
fundamental economics behind emissions trading and turn to a more financial and investor 
specific view. The chapter will start off with introducing the types of products traded, move 
on to the exchanges where they are traded and the participants in the market and end with 
some facts and overview about the size of the market. Price developments and other analyses 
of the products will be kept on hold until the next chapter – Chapter 4. 
3.1 Trading allowances 
There are a number of different allowances and credits available for trading today. The line 
is usually drawn between baseline-and-credit voluntary offset credits products and 
compliance cap-and-trade allowances products.  
 Basically, CO2 equivalent units (CO2e) as presented in Chapter 2.1.3 and Figure 2.1 
are the ones that are being traded. Common for all underlying credits and allowances is that, 
whatever the name, they give the holder within the scheme a right to emit one ton CO2e. The 
features of the right are dependent on the different products. GHGs are thus being 
commoditized and bought and sold as if they were barrels of oil or a ton of coal. The 
underlying commodities traded within the EU ETS are the European Union Allowances 
(EUAs) as issued under the scheme, and the allocation of EU allowances was introduced and 
discussed in Chapter 2.2.4.1 about the EU ETS. In addition, Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs) from CDM-projects are tradable and can be converted into EUAs within the EU ETS 
in order to link with the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and maintain a single 
currency within the EU. The EUAs and CERs have slightly different prices in the market, 
because of the higher uncertainty of CERs and other reasons which will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. Today, EUAs and CERs are traded at spot price, as futures and futures options.
87
  
Before moving on with the EU ETS trading, there are a number of other products 
being traded in today‟s carbon emissions market world as well. Figure 3.1 is inspired by 
Point Carbon‟s report “Carbon 2008 – Post-2012 is now” and gives a good overview of the 
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 41 
Figure 3.1: Overview of carbon credits available 
underlying products that are being traded in today‟s compliance and voluntary markets. Note 
that the largely unregulated voluntary markets are allowed to buy compliance market 
allowances, but compliance markets participants are more constrained and cannot buy 
voluntary market credits. This will increase demand in the compliance market and decrease 
supply for its participants and could be an important price signal if the voluntary market‟s 
share were big enough. We know from the discussion in 2.2.5 that the voluntary carbon 
markets were dwarfed to 0.5% of the compliance markets‟ capitalization in 2007 and the 
scales in the figure can thus be a bit misleading. 
  
 
 
On the compliance market side, the following permits are dealt with in this thesis. (EUAs 
and CERs were presented in the previous paragraph.): 
 Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) are Kyoto Protocol permits achieved through a 
Joint Implementation (JI) project as described in Chapter 2.2.4.1. The market created 
for the JI mechanism within Annex I countries has been active for years, with 
projects mainly started in New Zealand, Ukraine and Russia. However, no ERUs 
have so far been issued.
88
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 Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) are Kyoto Protocol permits which the emissions-
capped countries, Annex B, are allowed to buy and sell of their permitted emissions 
volumes. Since there currently is no international emissions trading based solely on 
the Kyoto Protocol, no known trades have yet taken place.
89
 However, the market is 
potentially very large with nations as Ukraine, Latvia, Hungary and Russia expected 
to perform the first trades in 2008 or 2009.
90
 
 Removal units (RMUs) are Kyoto Protocol permits on the basis of land use, land-
use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities such as reforestation. There are yet no 
registered trades of RMUs.
91
 
 RGGI allowances are permits eligible for trading under the cap-and-trade scheme of 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the US described in Chapter 2.2.4.2. 
 NSW Greenhouse Abatement Certificates (NGACs) are permits eligible for 
trading under the New South Wales GHG Abatement Scheme in Australia described 
in Chapter 2.2.4.2. NGACs are generated from Landfill Gas projects by organizations 
accredited by the scheme‟s Administrator. The market is however small and prices 
have fluctuated widely over the last years.
92
 
On the voluntary market side, the following permits are recognized in/by this thesis: 
 Verified Emission Reductions (VERs) are the biggest group of voluntary market 
credits and are generated by small scale projects, sometimes village-level activities, 
which are assessed and verified by third party organizations rather than through the 
more costly and regulated UNFCCC that generates CERs. In order to ensure that 
buyers are purchasing a real emission reduction, VERs must be calculated according 
to a VER Standard. There are many types of VERs and several VER Standards 
around the world which each set out different rules and the way emission reductions 
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are measured.
93
 This can illustrate the instability of this market, but a higher quality 
standard will thus be believed to decrease risk of failure and thus increase the price. 
A new Voluntary Carbon Standard
94
 is now emerging as a leading standard. 
 Emissions Reductions (ERs) are non-verified emissions reductions generated by 
projects that have not undergone a validation or verification process, but are 
contracted for purchase. The credits have been generated but no yet verified.
95
  
 Prospective Emissions Reductions (PERs) are transactions settled before ERs are 
delivered and typically used for forestry projects.
96
 
The products of the underlying EUAs and CERs are mostly the same. Futures are far 
most common, and an options market is under development. Swaps trading where one can 
bet on the price difference between CERs and EUAs are also possible. Spot trading with 
CERs will be available when the UNFCCCs International Transaction Log (ITL) is fully 
connected with the EU‟s CITL.97 EUAs, as the world‟s most traded carbon emission 
commodity, will now be the focus of attention through the rest of this chapter.  
The EUA contracts can be traded at spot price, but a much more significant derivatives 
market with futures and futures options have developed throughout Europe since trading 
started in 2005. Allowances traded in the EU ETS are not printed but held in accounts in 
electronic registries set up by the Member States. These registries are furthermore supervised 
by the EU‟s Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) which checks each 
transaction for irregularities. The installations covered by the EU ETS need to have an 
”operator holding account” in its national registry while any individual or organization 
wishing to participate in the market will be able to open a “person holding account” in any of 
the registries.
98
 In this way, the registries system keeps track of the ownership of allowances 
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in the same way as a banking system keeps track of the ownership of money. According to 
the NAP of the Member States, each installation will receive its assigned amount at the 
beginning of the year, presumably February 28
th
 although delays have and will happen, and 
the deadline for installations to submit its verified emissions report for the previous year is 
March 31
st
. Before April 30
th
 the installation will have to surrender the number of 
allowances according to its previous year emissions.
99
 
Although EUA contracts can be traded as spot price with immediately delivery, the 
standardized futures contracts with maturity in December each year are the ones most 
commonly traded. This is in order to be certain that all installations will have received their 
allowances for the year from the Member State.
100
 A futures contract calls for delivery of a 
commodity at a specified delivery or maturity date, for an agreed-upon price, called the 
futures price, to be paid at contract maturity. Because the futures exchange specifies all the 
terms of the contract, the traders need bargain only over the futures price. The trader can take 
a long position which commits to purchasing the commodity on the delivery date, or a short 
position which commits to delivering the commodity at a contract maturity. To exit the 
commitment, the holder of a futures position has to sell his long position or buy back his 
short position, effectively closing out the futures position and its contract obligations.
101
 The 
various EUA products are named “EUA Dec08”, “EUA Dec09” et cetera with the front year, 
currently being “EUA Dec08”, as the most traded. Figure 3.2102 on the following page shows 
the average daily EUA second phase spot and futures price from January 2
nd
 to May 22
nd
, 
2008 plotted on a line. 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 EU ETS website, about CITL, “Animated presentation on how the CITL works”: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/citl_en.htm  
100 Climate Corporation, The EU Allowance market: http://www.climatecorp.com/  
101 Bodie, Zvi et al. (2005): Investments. 6th Ed. (In Chapter 22: Futures Markets, p791-814). McGraw-Hill 
102 Figure made by the author with official public price data from ECX website: Market Data, ECX Historical Data, EUA 
Futures: http://www.ecxeurope.com/ . Spot prices from BlueNext: http://www.bluenext.eu  
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Figure 3.2: EUA futures average price path, Jan-May 2008 
 
 
The trajectory is upward sloping with a kink from the Dec12 to the Dec13 maturities. 
The upward or downward slope of this curve depends on who is most interested in security 
against future price movements, buyers or sellers, and this is likely to be related to the 
direction in which prices are generally expected to move.
103
 This theoretical point of view 
implies that market players anticipate an increasing EUA price in the coming years e.g. due 
to a scarcity of allowances and credits available in the market. Buyers are thus are willing to 
pay a higher price today for a future delivery than a spot delivery and sellers are less 
interested in this. The situation when futures prices are larger than the spot price is called a 
normal futures curve. A normal futures curve occurs when the market price is expected to 
increase and the holders of the front year or spot contract does not have clear benefits 
because of dividends, the convenience yield
104
, low storage costs and cost of carry.  An 
inverted market is the opposite of a normal futures curve.
105
 Furthermore, EUAs can be seen 
as both an investment asset for speculators, hedgers, as well as a consumption asset for 
power plants. Carbon emissions do however differ a lot from physical commodities often 
linked with these trends because of a non-existent storage cost, cost of carry and 
convenience yield due to the strict regulatory nature of the EU ETS market. The reason for 
                                                 
103 Hannesson, Rögnvaldur. (1998): Petroleum Economics. (In Chapter 1: Oil and oil prices, p11). Quorum Books 
104 Convenience yield is the monetary benefit from holding the physical asset and having it available when you need it. 
105 Bodie, Zvi et al. (2005): Investments. 6th Ed. (In Chapter 5: Futures Markets, p791-814). McGraw-Hill 
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the normal futures curve can be the ambitious EU 2020 environmental goals as explained in 
Chapter 2.2.4.1 and increased EU emissions over the last year.
106
 Large uncertainties and 
rumors of a tighter cap in relation to the structure of a third EU ETS phase from 2013 can 
explain the leap from the 2012 contract to the 2013 contract. 
 In addition to futures themselves, a futures options market for EUAs has developed 
and standardized futures options contracts on the underlying EUA futures can be bought on 
various exchanges. An option is a financial derivative that represents a contract sold by one 
party, called the option writer, to another party, called the option holder. A call option gives 
the holder the right to purchase a futures contract for a specified price, called the exercise or 
strike price, on or before some specified expiration date. A put option gives the holder the 
right to sell a futures contract for a specified strike price on or before some expiration date. 
American options allow exercise before the specified expiration date, while European 
options only allow exercise on the expiry date.
107
 European-style options are in most cases 
easier to value and are thus mostly used in the options derived from EUAs.
108
 This thesis 
will not go into a valuation of EUA futures options, but assume that the price of EUAs are 
unknown in the future or at least not known with certainty, and thus non-stationary which is 
explained in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, the value of EUA futures options are dependent on the 
nature of the option, call or put, the underlying price of EUA futures, the strike price, life of 
the option, the volatility of the EUAs and the type of risk-free rate used.
109
 Since the option 
gives the buyer a right and the seller an obligation, the buyer has received something of 
value. The amount the buyer pays the seller for the option is called the option premium and 
is far less than the strike or exercise price. Option contracts are thus far more volatile and 
risky than simple futures and their prices vary widely.  
Since EUA futures contracts are the underlying commodity, options are believed to 
be most commonly used in connection with other derivatives or instruments in order to 
hedge risk and reduce risk from potential futures market movements. A liquid options 
                                                 
106 “Industry emissions rise in carbon price boost”, Reuters: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSL2383160120080523  
107 Bodie, Zvi et al. (2005): Investments. 6th Ed. (In Chapter 20: Options Markets, p697-705). McGraw-Hill 
108 European Climate Exchange website, Products and Services, “What are Options? – Key points about Options”: 
http://www.ecxeurope.com/  
109 Bodie, Zvi et al. (2005): Investments. 6th Ed. (In Chapter 21: Option Valuation, p748). McGraw-Hill 
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market is needed in order to hedge effectively. By doing this, it is possible for advanced 
speculators to earn on certain price movements or simply volatility of the underlying 
commodity itself. Four alternative trading strategies involving futures options are 
recognized: 
1. A position in the futures option; 
2. A position in the futures option and the underlying future; 
3. A position in two or more future options of the same type (spread); 
4. A position in a mixture of calls & puts (combination). 110 
 Additionally, both futures and option futures of EUAs can be used in more 
sophisticated instruments by installations and speculators in connection with other 
commodity derivatives. In this way, one can for example hedge the price of coal futures with 
EUA futures since the demand for EUAs is believed to decrease when the price of carbon 
emission intensive coal increases relative to gas. As already discussed, this will force power 
plants substitution from coal to gas or other less carbon intensive fuels. Like this, the EUAs 
can be used to hedge power plants‟ and other installations‟ input costs as well as providing a 
market for speculators with diverse portfolios that bet on the future direction of the market. 
The strategy and products traded will often be influenced by the relative liquidity and size of 
the respective market. To this date, the EUA futures with maturity in December same year 
are by far the most important product on the various exchanges with typically 90% of the 
overall carbon trading.
 111
  
 
 
                                                 
110 Hull, John C. (2007): Fundamentals of Futures and Options markets. 6th Ed. (In Chapter 10: Trading Strategies Involving 
Options), Prentice Hall 
111 “EU member states not ready to issue EU allowances” 2008-02-06, Montel Powernews: 
http://www.montelpowernews.com/ . Needs login to access news search. 
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3.2 Exchanges and their participants 
In 2006 and 2007 the carbon trading market witnessed unprecedented growth in this asset 
class, not only from mayor CO2-emitting industrial companies,but also from newer 
participants like commercial firms, banks and financial institutions that recognize the 
attractiveness of this market for managing risks and earning returns on capital. The 
exchanges trading EUAs are marketplaces that manage the marketing and product 
development of the underlying commodity. In addition, a clearinghouse acts as an 
intermediary between each pair of traders, acting as the short position for each long and as 
the long position for each short. In this way traders need not be concerned about the 
performance of the trader on the opposite side of the contract. On the exchange, gains and 
losses on a futures position are settled daily, called “marking to market”. This, together with 
the maintenance margin which is a critical value amount of equity that must be maintained in 
an account, is determined by the exchange‟s clearinghouse and reviewed based on historical 
price fluctuations of the contract. This is in order to reduce credit risk to the exchange and 
the clearinghouse.
112
 
As one of the goals of this thesis, some 
research of the emissions trading exchanges 
where products eligible for trading under the EU 
ETS has been done. All the exchanges trade 
electronically and provide standardized versions 
of the products on the underlying allowances or 
credits traded. A spot sample with data gathered 
from the different exchange‟s websites on the 
settle prices has been conducted in Figure 3.3 
and shows no or close to none arbitrage opportunities. The minor price differences observed 
can be caused by the opening hours of the exchange, its liquidity at closing time or simply 
sampling error of the spot test. Figure 3.4 gives an overview of the seven leading emissions 
trading exchanges recognized by this thesis: 
 
                                                 
112 European Climate Exchange website: “What Are Futures? – Margin”: http://www.ecxeurope.com/  
Figure 3.3: Spot sample of settle prices 
                     gathered May 27th, 2008 
  EUA-Dec08 
European Climate Exchange  €        26.34  
Nord Pool  €        26.30  
European Energy Exchange  €        26.37  
BlueNext  €        26.10  
Energy Exchange Austria              N/A  
Climex           N/A  
The Green Exchange (NYMEX)  €        26.40  
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Figure 3.4: Seven leading emissions trading exchanges trading EU ETS related products 
 
Exchange name Allowances/credit
s traded 
Products HQ location 
European Climate Exchange EUAs; CERs Futures; Options London, UK 
Nord Pool EUAs; CERs Futures; Spot Oslo, Norway 
BlueNext EUAs; CERs Futures; Spot Paris, France 
European Energy Exchange EUAs; CERs Futures; Spot Leipzig, Germany 
The Green Exchange (NYMEX) EUAs; CERs Futures; Options New York, US 
Climex EUAs; CERs; VERs Futures; Spot; Auctions  The Netherlands 
Energy Exchange Austria EUAs Spot; Auctions Vienna, Austria 
 
The European Climate Exchange (ECX) is owned by The Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX), which is the world‟s largest and North America‟s only voluntary and 
legally binding carbon credit exchange.
113
 The CCX commenced in December 2003, and the 
subsidiary ECX was launched in April 2005 and was listed and admitted to trading on the 
ICE Futures Europe's electronic platform. ECX is currently known as the most liquid, pan-
European platform for carbon emissions trading, attracting over 85 % of the exchange-traded 
volume in the market.
114
 They are thus the biggest player in the market and offer futures and 
futures option contracts on both EUAs and CERs. 
 Nord Pool was the first exchange in the world to list EUA and CER contracts, in 
February 2005 and June 2007 respectively. It is Europe‟s largest and most liquid 
marketplace for physical and financial power contracts, and the second largest exchange in 
EUA and CER trading, offering day-ahead spot contracts on EUAs and futures.
115
 
 BlueNext is the EU‟s leading spot exchange for EUAs and took over the carbon 
trading business of Powernext, which was launched in June 2005. It was established in 
                                                 
113 CCX website, Overview: http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/content.jsf?id=821  
114 European Climate Exchange website, About ECX: http://www.ecxeurope.com/  
115 Nord Pool website, Emissions derivatives: http://www.nordpool.com/en/asa/Services/Emissions/  
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December 2007 when NYSE Euronext
116
 and Caisse des Dépôt
117
 joined forces with a goal 
to become the world's largest exchange for environmental-related products.
118
 
 European Energy Exchange (EEX) is the leading energy exchange in Central 
Europe and has, together with Eurex
119
, been trading in the carbon emissions market since 
December 2007. They offer trading in EUA and CER futures and options on EUA futures.  
 The Green Exchange, as explained in Chapter 2.1.2, is the emissions trading part of 
the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), which is the world's largest physical 
commodities exchange. It was initially trading in NOX and SO2 contracts in relation to the 
US Acid Rain Program. The Green Exchange brands itself as the world‟s most 
comprehensive environmental marketplace and commenced trading with futures and futures 
options on EUAs and CERs in March 2008.
120
  
 Climex is a relatively small exchange and commenced trading in 2008 with spot 
trading and auctioning of EUAs.
121
 Energy Exchange Austria is another small emissions 
trading exchange where auctions on EUA spot contracts are taking place.
122
  
 These seven exchanges account for close to all trading of allowances and credits 
under the EU ETS. As the market matures, there has been a trend that international investors 
and speculators enter the increasing carbon emissions market of the EU. Other exchanges 
such as the National Commodity & Derivatives Exchange in Mumbai, India which started 
CERs trading in April 2008
123
 and Japan‟s Tokyo Stock Exchange124 are also positioning 
                                                 
116 NYSE Euronext is a holding company owning, among others, the world‟s largest stock exchange New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and Euronext in Paris: http://www.nyse.com/about/1088808971270.html  
117 Caisse des Dépôts is a public financial institution that performs public-interest missions on behalf of France‟s central, 
regional and local governments: http://www.caissedesdepots.fr/spip.php?article57  
118 BlueNext website, About BlueNext: http://www.bluenext.eu/  
119 Eurex is one of the world's largest derivatives exchanges and the leading clearing house in Europe: 
http://www.eurexchange.com/  
120 The Green Exchange powered by NYMEX, Overview: http://www.greenfutures.com/overview/  
121 Climex website: http://www.climex.com/about-climex.aspx  
122 Energy Exchange Austria, “Trading Concept”: http://en.exaa.at/spotmarket_CO2/marketplace/trading_concept.html  
123 NCDEX website, “Carbon Credits”: http://www.ncdex.com/product/CER.aspx?comm=CERCC  
124 Tokyo Stock Exchange website, “Carbon Market (Emissions Trading)”: http://www.tse.or.jp/english/rules/carbon-m/  
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themselves to trade EU allowances in the future. Banks, hedge funds, pension funds and 
energy trading shops are beginning to seek products in order to trade actively in carbon 
emissions products, diversity portfolios or simply gain experience within the potentially 
huge market. Because of this, the next chapter will provide some analysis and interesting 
aspects of the liquid size of the global market compared to the more commonly traded stock 
markets around the world.  
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3.3 Size of market 
This chapter will deal with the relative size of the global carbon market compared to stock 
markets and can be seen as a preface to Chapter 4, which will compare EUA price 
developments with the European stock markets. In order to define the size of the market, this 
thesis finds it most worthwhile to compare the total value of trading. Popular markets have 
more traders and products available which both are fundamental contributors to the overall 
total value. Note that the global carbon market also includes the voluntary markets although 
their share is believed to be relative small compared to the compliance markets.  
Figure 3.5 provides an overview of the total value 
of the global carbon market from 2005. The data 
are gathered from Point Carbon‟s125 annual public 
carbon market reports
126
, and shows an 
unprecedented growth of the asset class over the 
last few years. In order to add depth to the 
predicted numbers, another carbon market firm, Rabo India Finance Ltd
127
 in Mumbai, India, 
has estimated the global carbon market to be in the range of €60-70 billion in 2008.128  The 
EU ETS alone (EUAs) is by Point Carbon expected to account for 75% of the global value in 
2008 while it had over 80% in 2006 and around 70% in 2007. Increased allowance auctions 
and a surge in the options market are believed to be important factors to boost volumes of 
the market. Furthermore, the market for CERs from CDM projects is believed to account for 
20% of this while ERUs from JI projects and other markets such as the RGGI, AAUs of the 
Kyoto Protocol and voluntary carbon offsets are believed to account for the rest.
129
  
                                                 
125 Point Carbon is a world-leading provider of independent news, analysis and consulting services for European and global 
power, gas and carbon markets: http://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus  
126 Point Carbon‟s annual public carbon market reports: http://www.pointcarbon.com/research/carbonmarketresearch/  
127 Rabo IndiaFinance (RIF) website: 
http://www.rabobank.com/content/global/office_pages/Asia/India/Mumbai/mumbai.jsp  
128 “Carbon trading market likely to be €60-70 billion”, The Hindu BusinessLine online news 2008-16-05: 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/blnus/14161820.htm  
129 Environmental Finance news, ”Carbon market to be worth €63 billion in 2008 – Point Carbon” 2008-02-28: 
http://www.environmental-finance.com/onlinews/0228car.html   
Figure 3.5: Global carbon market size 
   Increase: 
2005:  € 9.4 bn    
2006:  € 22.5 bn  163 % 
2007:  € 40 bn  90 % 
2008 (pred):  € 63 bn  58 % 
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To put things in perspective, the figure found in Appendix 3 shows the results from 
an analysis of the total value of the world‟s different stock markets in 2007 compared to the 
projected size of the carbon market in 2008. Data from the total value of share trading from 
the world‟s 51 reporting stock exchanges was gathered from The World Federation of Stock 
Exchanges, which is the global trade association for the exchange industry. Its exchanges 
account for over 97% of world stock market capitalization, and most of its exchange-traded 
futures, options, listed investment funds, and bonds.
130
 The data was gathered in US Dollars 
and converted to Euros using the average 2007 EUR/USD exchange rate of 0.73.
131
 Figure 
3.5 gives an interesting overview of the relative size of the stock markets and the carbon 
market‟s projected size in 2008 is merely 0.09% of the total capitalization of the world‟s 
stock exchanges in 2007. This discovery is an interesting fact and when comparing Figure 
3.5 to 3.6, the 2008 global carbon emissions market is projected to be as large as the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange in Poland was in 2007. 
 
                                                 
130 World Federation of Stock Exchanges website: http://www.world-exchanges.org  
131 Using data from Yahoo! Finance: http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=USDEUR=X  
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4. A price for CO2 in the EU  
This part deals with the price for carbon emission allowances. As previously presented, the 
largest and only existent compliance cap-and-trade market for carbon emissions is the EU 
ETS. This part will thus deal with the most traded products which are the Emissions Union 
Allowance (EUA) futures. The first section will introduce and discuss the main demand 
drivers of the EUA price, while the second will go through the historic price path and try to 
explain some of the central shifts that have occurred since April 22
nd
, 2005. The third section 
will present a financial analysis of the connection between the stock market and the price of 
carbon emissions allowances. This is an interesting area of study and maybe one of the most 
neglected factors when it comes to explaining what drives the EUA price. The moderately 
simple regression analysis used is not without controversy as the analysis‟ concluding 
discussion will reveal.   
4.1 What determines the carbon price 
The EUA price is, as in any other market, set by supply and demand. The EU created the 
ETS market, and supply is thus determined by the amount of allowances and carbon credits 
available to the market. Demand is set by the amount of emissions in relation to the overall 
allocation. The main fundamentals influencing the demand for EUAs are the weather, fuel 
and power prices, CDM/JI supply, political decisions as well as multiple other more or less 
recognizable factors. The interpretation of these fundamentals has become crucial in 
maturing carbon trading markets and requires complex models and comprehensive 
understanding by participants.  
Weather is influential, as temperatures determine power demand and consumption. 
Precipitation increases the potential for hydropower production and wind the potential for 
wind turbines, causing shifts in dependence on fossil fuels for power generation. Fuel prices 
are important as the relative price differential between coal and gas will determine which of 
the fuels that will be used for power production, called substitution. Since gas prices are 
highly correlated with the price of oil because of substitution between them in certain 
sectors
132
 a soaring oil price is believed to boost carbon prices as well. Relatively cheaper 
                                                 
132 Hannesson, Rögnvaldur. (1998): Petroleum Economics. Quorum Books 
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coal compared to gas will increase GHG emissions, as more power production will be based 
on coal, which emits more GHGs per unit of output than gas. Higher CO2 emissions will 
hence increase the carbon price.
133
   
Figure 4.1
134
 on next page is based a web-survey conducted by Point Carbon and 
illustrates the short-term price drivers in the EU ETS. We do however have to differentiate 
between the short and long term in this instance. The industrial companies and utilities that 
are regulated by the market often operate project planning horizons of 30-50 years due to 
large investment costs. Hence, the long-term price signals are important in order to get a 
decent picture of how the market works and the market players are positioning themselves. 
Figure 4.2
135
 illustrates the long-term price drivers in the EU-ETS.  
The underlying responses in this Point Carbon survey© was given from trading 
sectors such as finance and banking investors, CDM/JI project developers, academics, 
governments and carbon investment funds, and permission to use it in this thesis was granted 
by editor Kjetil Røine at Point Carbon. It becomes evident from Figure 4.1 that the carbon 
market is still, and will remain, a politically driven market, as supply and demand for 
allowances and credits are determined to a significant degree by political decisions - both in 
the short and long term.  
 Other factors are believed by this thesis to be overall economic conditions in the EU 
and liquidity factors in the carbon market itself. The overall economic conditions in the EU 
can be explained by the performance of stock markets where financial institutions are the 
biggest players. To make ends meet, financial institutions are showing a growing interest in 
the carbon markets and it would thus be instructive to look at the performance of the EU 
stock markets compared to the EUA futures price. This analysis will be performed in 
Chapter 4.3.  
 
                                                 
133 ”Carbon 2007 – A new climate for carbon trading”, Point Carbon, 2007-03-13, www.pointcarbon.com  
134 ”Carbon 2007 – A new climate for carbon trading”, Point Carbon, 2007-03-13, p12, www.pointcarbon.com, 
(Copyrighted  by Point Carbon, permission to use granted by editor Kjetil Røine) 
135 ”Carbon 2007 – A new climate for carbon trading”, Point Carbon, 2007-03-13, p12, www.pointcarbon.com 
(Copyrighted  by Point Carbon, permission to use granted by editor Kjetil Røine) 
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Figure 4.1: Short-term price drivers in the EU ETS 
Figure 4.2: Long-term price drivers in the EU ETS 
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Figure 4.3: Historical Data – ECX EUA Futures Contract 
4.2 Carbon price development 
This chapter will examine the price path for EUAs since futures trading became available in 
early 2005. It is informative to look at this to get an overview of the price movements and 
the significant political factors controlling the market. The EU ETS was highly criticized 
because of the collapse of the price for EUAs in 2007, and this section, among other things, 
will try to explain how this happened. The focus will be on the main price drivers explained 
in the previous chapter. The market information is collected from Montel Powernews
136
 
which follows the carbon market with daily news and commentaries from traders. The 
fundamentals behind the price movements recognized are complex and will be addressed at 
best. For practical reasons, the specific sources will not be cited in the text but they are all 
taken from Montel Powernews‟ daily carbon market news updates.  The historical price data 
is gathered from The European Climate Exchange
137
. The time series data of ECX EUA 
Dec07 and EUA Dec08 from April 22
nd
 2005 to May 23
rd
, 2008 is plotted in Figure 4.3.  
As already noted, the ECX is the largest EUA exchange and it has been chosen as a 
focal point of the price development analysis. Both EUA futures products commenced 
                                                 
136 Montel Powernews website: http://www.montelpowernews.com/ . Login needed to access news search. 
137 European Climate Exchange website, Market Data, ECX Historical Data, EUA Futures: http://www.ecxeurope.com/  
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trading on April 22
nd, 2005. The EUA Dec07 future‟s date of maturity was December 17th, 
2007 when it settled at the lowest possible trading price of €0.01. Five main fundamental 
price changes and trend channels have been recognized with the fall in 2 and 3 for EUA 
Dec07 as the most momentous and commonly known: 
4.2.1 April 22nd, 2005 – April 19th, 2006: The beginning 
This period stretches from the beginning of the EUA Futures trade at the ECX in April 2005 
until the prices reached a high on April 19
th
, 2006. The market was still small and it was thus 
very difficult to explain price movements due to the great number of price driving factors 
and the immaturity of the market. When the ECX commenced trading, there had been 
trading going both on Nord Pool and Over-the-counter (OTC) market for some time. Prices 
were at all-time-high around €17.00 and a reasonable explanation at the time was that the 
power sector was short on allowances, and the presence of speculative players in the market. 
However, both liquidity and the price saw an upward trend and reaching new record levels 
almost every day due to high oil prices, and dry weather conditions in Europe generating a 
lack of hydropower which needed to be compensated by thermal power production. The 
market reached a top of almost €30 in mid-June 2005 but softened quickly, allegedly 
because of the entrance of Eastern European sellers. The market price stayed around €20-25 
until the end of the 2005 with fuel switching, political factors and the lack of liquidity in the 
market being the largest drivers. Power companies were the most active participants during 
this time. Increasing oil and gas prices together with cold and dry European weather 
conditions caused the EUA prices to swirl upwards at the beginning of 2006. As the trading 
entered April 2006, prices were around €30 and experts forecasted EUA prices of €40 and up 
in short time.  
4.2.2 April 20th, 2006 – May 12th, 2006: The drop 
As the April 30
th
 deadline for companies in the EU ETS to surrender allowances from 2005 
approached (See Chapter 3.1 about surrendering allowances), reports began being published 
throughout the EU revealing much lower carbon emissions than the market and regulators 
had expected. Consequently, EUA prices dropped over 10% from April 25
th
 to April 26
th
 and 
reached a low of about €10.00 on May 12th. The situation was brutal and very dramatic for 
market players, and as the over-allocation of EUAs came to light, traders put their entire 
trust in the market into doubt. Questions about the transparency of the carbon market and the 
way new information in emissions reports were released did cause major controversy 
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because of a data fiasco at the CITL causing emissions data from 20 countries being released 
before the advertised date.  
4.2.3 May 15th, 2006 – April 12th, 2007: The downfall 
Carbon prices firmed to trading around €15-21 after the low on May 12th, 2006. The front-
year contracts were relatively stable but traders called the EUA market a wild card and 
nervous trading widely based on rumors developed. Fundamentals as the activity of German 
power plants and weather gained increasing influence in the market as well, and second 
phase EUA products as EUA Dec08 followed a downward trend. Bearish oil and gas prices 
and softening German power consumption caused the market to fall at the end of September 
2006 and phase I products were trading downwards but around €11-13 until November. 
Some market players argued that because of unfamiliarity with trading, the surplus of EUAs 
was not coming to the market. The Stern Report was released around this time and NAPs for 
phase II came under discussion, causing phase II products to stop falling and trade sideways 
while phase I products dropped.  Due to high selling activity of phase I products by EU-ETS 
carbon emitting companies because of over-allocation and the consequently plunging price, 
the phase I/phase II spread widened into the beginning of 2007. Because of this, the trading 
moved to phase II products. The phase I products that no one needed continued its fall 
towards €0.01 at maturity in December 2007. At the end of this period, some traders 
assumed that first phase allowances were pulling down the second, and rumors about phase 
II NAPs and the number of CERs allowed in the ETS flourished. Although still following a 
negative trend, the EUA Dec08 were positively influenced by the EU 2020 environmental 
goals announced at the end of February 2007 and cuts in the Member States‟ NAPs for phase 
II.  
4.2.4 April 13th, 2007 – February 2nd, 2008: A maturing market 
On April 13
th
, 2007 the EUA Dec08 broke through the technical resistance of the negative 
trend. This marked the final independence of the first phase products and was the start of a 
carbon price rise on the back of stronger German power consumption, bullish phase II policy 
news, power versus carbon hedging by power plants and natural sellers failing to enter the 
market. Experts were however surprised by the rise and suggested that it reflected the 
immaturity and illiquidity of the market at that point. In the meantime, however, the liquidity 
grew, new market players as financial institutions entered the market, and the European 
Climate Exchange (ECX) saw its average daily volume increase by 233% year on year. The 
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EUA Dec08 rose to €25.15 on May 29th with massive profit taking place the following week 
causing the price to fall back to around €21.00. Fundamentals as buying interest from power 
plants, other carbon emitting companies in the EU-ETS and financials, weather, fuel prices, 
German power and second phase NAPs as well as technical trading drove the maturing EUA 
market throughout the summer and the rest of 2007.  At the beginning of 2008, rumors of 
plans by the European Commission to cut back on free allocation of allowances to 
companies after 2012, stronger German power and oil/gas prices gave the market a bullish 
sentiment. Rumors of an over-supply of CERs, selling and lack of faith in the market caused 
the EUA Dec08 to reaching a low of €18.84 on February 5th, 2008. 
4.2.5 February 6th, 2008 – May 23rd, 2008: The recent rise 
As seen in Figure 4.3, there has been an upward trend of the EUA Dec08 since February 6
th
, 
2008 where prices have firmed from the low registered on February 5
th
. The reason to this 
recent rise is said to be the boost in oil and gas prices as well as a more mature market where 
fundamentals are able to control the prices more significantly. Although coal prices have 
firmed significantly over the same period, the relative rise of gas has attributed to the bullish 
sentiment on carbon. Up until the end of this thesis‟ analysis period, carbon prices rose to 
over €26 on the back of the strong energy commodity markets in addition to concerns about 
supply of CERs. 
 It can be said that the first phase of the EU ETS experience provided a preview of 
some of the pitfalls associated with ‟making‟ a market. Both phases of the EU ETS have 
inspired a fair amount of debate regarding what exactly a unit CO2e will be worth. 
Consequently, the single most important lesson from the first phase of the EU ETS was to 
not over-allocate allowances.  
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4.3 Analysis 
The following steps will be taken in formulating this econometric analysis: First, a general 
statement of the problem has to be made. Note that the author has not found any previous 
studies on this specific area. Second, the formulation and presentation of the theory relevant 
for performing the analysis will be discussed. Third, the collection of data and statistical 
interpretation of the model will be presented. The forth section will present the analysis and 
evaluate the model from a theoretical perspective with respect to the problems initially 
posed. If findings are sufficient, a fifth conclusion part will try to evaluate whether the 
outcome is right, i.e. if special circumstances have caused it or if the outcome will sustain 
and be reliable in the future as well. The econometrics used in this analysis are kept simple 
and more complex models and analyses have been ruled out. Hence, be aware that this 
analysis model is unlikely to be able to completely capture every relevant real-world 
phenomenon, but it should present a sufficiently good approximation that will be useful for 
the purpose at hand.  
4.3.1 Formulation of the theoretical problem 
This analysis will assess if a relationship exists between returns on carbon emission futures 
and the rate of return on the overall stock market.  We can introduce this by stating that in 
the way production and the overall economy (GPD) will influence energy used, the energy 
used will in turn increase emissions and influence the demand for carbon emissions. A 
booming economy would thus see a rise in carbon emission prices. In addition, Sam C. 
Syvertsen, a much sought after Carbon Emissions Trading lecturer and the Director of 
Analysis of Markedskraft ASA
138
, one of Norway‟s leading power and carbon analysis and 
trading companies, has stated that one of the biggest analytical challenges in the carbon 
market is to discover a methodology to make a bridge between the short and long term price 
perspectives. The discount rate used is one of the biggest questions in of this theme. Power 
companies or financial institutions can invest and trade in carbon emissions products as an 
alternative to disinvest/sell their carbon emitting business or invest in other assets. Stock 
markets are the largest place to perform these alternatives for carbon market participants, and 
a discount rate of carbon emission products derived from the EU industry average would 
thus be a plausible solution. This chosen area of study is therefore the result of the big 
                                                 
138 Markedskraft ASA website: http://www.markedskraft.com/index.asp  
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analytical challenges in the carbon market as well as a wish to provide a comprehensive, 
albeit easy to follow, overview of whether the carbon prices can be said to be influenced by 
stock markets. The last point is an important one since the analysis cannot explain which 
variable is dependent on which or whether there is a third variable influencing them both. 
This is called a spurious relationship and will be addressed later on.
139
  
4.3.2 Formulation of the model and presentation of relevant 
theory 
This thesis will not go into developing a single discount rate, but simply look at the 
connection between the EU‟s largest stock markets and the price of carbon futures in order 
to create a Beta coefficient ( ). The appropriate risk premium and discount rate for the 
carbon futures can then be calculated from a model such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM)
140
 or the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT)
141
. The beta measures the extent to which 
returns on an asset and the market move together. Formally, CAPM Beta for an asset i is 
defined as: 
 
where  is the return of asset i,  the return of the market portfolio M and   the variance 
of M over a specified period of time. Covariance measures how much the return on two risky 
assets move in tandem. A positive covariance means that the asset returns move together, 
while a negative covariance means that the returns move inversely. Variance  and standard 
deviation  is a measure of volatility and riskiness of an asset or portfolio. In this analysis, 
                                                 
139 Brooks, Chris. (2002): Introductory econometrics for finance. (Page 367-368). Cambridge University Press 
140 CAPM is a model that gives a precise prediction of the relationship that we should observe between the risk of an asset 
and its expected return: Eri = rf + βi[E(rm) – rf]. Assumptions: All investors aim to maximize utilities, are rational risk-
averse, are price takers and cannot influence prices, can lend and borrow unlimited under the risk free rate of interest. 
Securities are highly divisable into small parcels. No transaction or taxation costs incurs. Source: Bodie, Zvi et al. (2005): 
Investments. 6th Ed. (In Chapter 9: The Capital Asset Pricing Model, p281-316). McGraw-Hill 
141 APT is an asset pricing theory that is derived from a factor model, using diversification and arbitrage arguments. The 
theory describes the relationship between expected returns on securities, given that there are no opportunities to create 
wealth through risk-free arbitrage investments. Source: Bodie, Zvi et al. (2005): Investments. 6th Ed. (In Chapter 11: 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory, p343-363). McGraw-Hill 
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the two risky assets are carbon emission futures and the stock market portfolio. If  is 
greater than 1, the carbon emission futures‟ rate of return is more sensitive to changes in the 
level of the overall market than is the average asset. The CAPM is an estimation of the 
discount rate given that the asset is added to a well-diversified portfolio. There are heavy 
assumptions behind this model, see reference 140, and it is thus not believed to be perfectly 
applicable in the real world. CAPM is however widely used and it will be the theoretical 
basis of this part of the analysis. When using CAPM, the model only takes into account the 
market risk of the asset, i.e. the tendency of an asset‟s returns to responds to swings in the 
market, since it assumes all investors are well-diversified and not affected by individual risks 
in each asset (nonsystematic risk). In this case, the nonsystematic risk of EUA futures will be 
the main price drivers discussed in Chapter 4.1 such as weather and ETS policies.
142
 
Beta for financial use can be calculated directly from two time-series in a spread 
sheet or by using regression analysis. In practice it is common to use between two and five 
years of monthly returns in order to estimate Beta. Computing Beta with very short horizon 
returns (such as daily returns) may lead to problems related to non-synchronous trading. This 
will be explained and become evident in the first test. Regression analysis is one of the most 
important tools used in econometrics and is concerned with describing and evaluating the 
relationships between a given variable and one or more other variables. While dealing with 
relationships between variables, it is important to be aware of the difference between 
regression and correlation. The correlation between two variables measures the degree of 
linear association between them and it is not implied that changes in X cause changes in Y or 
vice versa. The correlations used in this analysis will also be explained in a significance 
perspective depicted from the P-value. The P-value of a test is the probability of observing a 
test statistic at least as extreme as the one computed given that the null hypothesis is true.
143
 
In a simple regression, the dependent variable (y) and the independent variable (x) are 
treated very differently. The y variable is assumed to be random and have a probability 
distribution while the x variable is assumed to be non-stochastic and have fixed values in 
repeated samples. Regression as a tool is thus more flexible and more powerful than 
correlation. Note, however, that as a general rule we cannot determine the value of y for a 
                                                 
142 Bodie, Zvi et al. (2005): Investments. 6th Ed. (In Chapter 9: The Capital Asset Pricing Model, p281-316). McGraw-Hill 
143 Keller, G., Warrack, B. (2003). Statistics for Management and Economics. Page 327. Brooks/Cole – Thomson Learning 
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value of x that is far outside the range of the sample values of x.
144
 Finding a relationship 
between two variables and proving that this is a significant one is thus two different 
questions. It is important to assess how well the linear model fits the data. If the fit is poor, 
we should discard the linear model, draw the conclusions needed and perhaps seek another 
one. 
 The following null-hypothesis has been developed:  
 H0: No linear relationship exists between returns on carbon emission futures and the 
rate of return on the overall stock market.  
 
The following alternative hypothesis has been developed:  
 H1 : A linear relationship exists between returns on carbon emission futures and the 
rate of return on the overall stock market. 
 
The null hypothesis specifies that there is no linear relationship, which means that the linear 
slope projected by the regression is 0, i.e. . We perform a two-tail test to determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence to infer that a linear relationship exists,  ≠ 0. The 
alternative hypothesis test this.  
A linear regression approximates a straight line t between the two data points in 
question. The mathematic description of the linear regression line in the following analysis is 
 
Coefficient α is a constant and coefficient β is the Beta already introduced. ε is a random 
disturbance term which is not be calculated, but added to the model to make it more realistic 
since all of the data points cannot lay exactly on a straight line.
145
  
                                                 
144 Brooks, Chris. (2002): Introductory econometrics for finance. (In Chapter 3: p42-43). Cambridge University Press 
145 Brooks, Chris. (2002): Introductory econometrics for finance. (In Chapter 3: p42-132). Cambridge University Press 
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Type I error occurs when we reject a true null hypothesis, and a Type II error is 
defined as not rejecting a false null hypothesis. A significance level of 5% is set in order to 
reject the null hypothesis, 2.5% on each side. Hence, a P-value under 0.025 on the constant 
will be needed to reject. The test statistic used is the „Student t distribution‟ because of the 
limited amount of data and knowledge about the mean of the following samples: 
 
where sy is the standard error of y which is calculated by a formula with v = n – 2 degrees of 
freedom, where n is the number of observations. The critical value of t will thus be found 
separately in each test, and have to be smaller than the observed value in the analysis in 
order to reject the null hypothesis.
146
 
The null hypothesis does not initially say anything about the significance of the 
relationship. Because of this, the tests run will be interpreted in two ways: First, a Beta to be 
used in a CAPM of carbon emissions futures will be computed the best way possible. 
Second, the null hypothesis will be tested with a two-way significance level of 5%. This 
approach is in line with the formulation of the theoretical problem in 4.3.1. A regression 
analysis gives numerous outputs, and the test of Beta addresses only the question of whether 
there is enough evidence to infer that a linear relationship exists. But it will also be useful to 
measure another strength of that linear relationship: This regression analysis will also focus 
on the coefficient of determination, which is denoted . In financial analysis, the slope 
coefficient β is a measure of the asset‟s market-related or systematic risk because it measures 
the volatility of the asset price that is related to the overall market volatility. An example: If 
 for asset i we will interpret this to mean that for each 1% increase in the market 
portfolio M, the average increase in asset i‟s return is 0.70%.  measures the proportion of 
the total risk that is systematic, and if , 45% of asset i‟s total risk is market related 
and 55% associated with events specific to asset i rather than the market. This is called 
                                                 
146 Keller, G., Warrack, B. (2003). Statistics for Management and Economics. (In Chapter 8: Continuous Probability 
Distributions, p252-258). Brooks/Cole – Thomson Learning 
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nonsystematic risk.
147
 In this case, as earlier mentioned, the nonsystematic risk of EUA 
futures will be the main price drivers discussed in Chapter 4.1 such as weather and ETS 
policies. 
4.3.3 Collection of data and statistical interpretations 
The data used in this analysis is market data gathered from European Climate Exchange 
(ECX) and STOXX Ltd. Publicly available historical data of EUA futures is gathered from 
the ECX website, using the EUA Dec08 futures contract as a benchmark and dependent y 
variable.
148
 Broad stock data in order to create a market portfolio of the EU is gathered from 
the STOXX Ltd. website that provides the Dow Jones STOXX indices which have become 
Europe's leading indices over the last years.
149
 The indices Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50® 
(SX5E) and Dow Jones EURO STOXX® TMI Electricity (SXEELC) have been chosen as 
best matches for this study although the EU area should not be confused with the smaller 
Eurozone. The SX5E is Europe's leading Blue-chip index for the Eurozone and covers 50 
stocks from 12 Eurozone countries.
150
 The SXEELC is a sector index and the Industry 
Classification Benchmark for major electricity companies in Europe and the Eurozone. SX5E or 
SXEELC will thus be the independent x variable. As already discussed, power companies in 
Europe are the largest carbon dioxide emitters and traders. It would thus be interesting to see 
the difference between an analysis concerning the market portfolio SX5E and the overall 
performance of power companies in SXEELC. Presumably, the systematic risk,  and , 
will be higher in the latter. The raw data used are time series data with a daily frequency 
from April 22
nd
, 2006 to May 23
rd
, 2008 which is consistent with the analysis in Chapter 4.2.  
For a number of statistical reasons, it is preferable not to work directly with the price 
series of the data, and raw-price series are usually converted into series of returns. The series 
of returns can be simple or continuously compounded returns also called log-returns, which 
are achieved as follows: 
                                                 
147 Keller, G., Warrack, B. (2003). Statistics for Management and Economics. (In Chapter 18: Simple Linear Regression 
and Correlation, p617-629). Brooks/Cole – Thomson Learning 
148 European Climate Exchange website, Market Data, ECX Historical Data, EUA Futures: http://www.ecxeurope.com/ 
149 STOXX Ltd. is a joint venture of Deutsche Börse AG, Dow Jones & Company and SWX Swiss Exchange: 
http://www.stoxx.com (Login needed). 
150 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
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Simple returns:    
Continuously compounded returns:  
where:   denotes the simple return at time t 
   denotes the continuously compounded return at time t 
   denotes the asset price at time t 
   denotes the natural logarithm 
Since this is a financial analysis, the continuously compounded return will be used. There are 
two main reasons for this: Firstly, the concept of return in finance often relates to the return 
over an infinitesimally short period of time. The frequency of the compounding of the return 
does not matter and thus returns across assets can more easily be compared. Secondly, log 
returns are time-additive and are more likely to have desirable statistical properties such as 
normality.
151
 
   The software used to perform the regression analysis is Minitab 15 Statistical 
Software
152
 and Microsoft Excel. 
4.3.4 Analysis outcome 
This part will present the outcomes of the regression analysis. Firstly, descriptive analysis of 
the data used will be presented followed by the regression data and graphs. Secondly, 
interpretation and conclusion will be made. The four regression tests will first be discussed 
in relation to finding a Beta for CAPM, and second the significance of the relationship. 
These points should be dealt with independently by the reader. The fifth test is a correlation 
analysis with historic oil prices. 
 
                                                 
151 Brooks, Chris. (2002): Introductory econometrics for finance. (In Chapter 1: p1-11). Cambridge University Press 
152 Minitab 15 Statistical Software by Minitab Inc.: http://www.minitab.com/  
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Figure 4.4: Relative daily price and index developments EUA Dec08 and SX5E 
Five tests have been chosen:  
1) Daily returns EUA Dec08 and SX5E, April 22nd, 2006 – May 23rd, 2008. 
2) Monthly returns EUA Dec08 and SX5E, April 22nd, 2006 – May 23rd, 2008. 
3) Weekly returns EUA Dec08 and SX5E, January 1st, 2008 – May 23rd, 2008 
4) Monthly returns EUA Dec08 and SXEELC, April 22nd, 2006 – May 23rd, 2008. 
5) A correlation analysis with oil, April 22nd, 2006 – May 23rd, 2008. 
4.1.1.1 Test 1: Daily returns EUA Dec08 and SX5E, April 22nd, 2006 
– May 23rd, 2008. 
This test uses the daily log returns on closing prices for EUA Dec08 and SX5E in order to 
infer if a linear relationship exists. The daily data gathered from ECX and STOXX was not 
synchronized and had to be adjusted due to data missing on different dates throughout the 
period because of country specific holidays and other unknown factors. Figure 4.4 shows 
relative price and index developments of each time-series. 
 
All Minitab outcomes from Test 1 can be found in Appendix 4.1. There are 784 observations 
in this test and descriptive analysis of the data shows among many other things a standard 
deviation (StDev) of 2.90% for EUA Dec08 and 1.14% for SX5E. This means that the 
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volatility of EUA Dec08 is higher than SX5E. This can also be interpreted from Figure 4.4. 
Critical value of t in this test is t.025,783 = 1.960.
153
 The histogram shows a decent normality 
around 0% return on each time series, and the correlation between the two is calculated to 
0.035 which explains a positive, but extremely small relation. In addition, the high 
correlation P-Value of 0.321 > 0.025 tells us that this is not significant. 
 The linear regression gave the following outcome: 
 = EUA Dec08 (daily) = 0.00052 + 0.0905 SX5E (daily) 
where 
 = 0.0905 ;  = 0.1% ; T = 0.99 ; P = 0.321. 
This would mean that for every 1% increase of SX5E, the EUA Dec08 would 
increase with 0.0905%. This relationship would explain only 0.1% of the total risk of EUA 
Dec08.  But as already discussed, if Beta is computed with very short horizon returns 
(such as daily returns), it may lead to problems related to non-synchronous trading. It was thus to 
expect that the relationship and outcome of this test would be small and of little use. 
The t-value is 0.99 and P-Value 0.321.The t value is under the critical value of 1.96 and 
P-Value is over its critical value of 0.025. Hence, this result is not statistically significant and H0, 
not surprisingly, cannot be rejected. 
4.1.1.2 Test 2: Monthly returns EUA Dec08 and SX5E, April 22nd, 
2006 – May 23rd, 2008. 
This test is using the monthly log returns on the monthly closing prices for EUA Dec08 and 
SX5E in order to infer if a linear relationship exists. This test will follow best practice where 
it is common to use between two and five years of monthly returns in order to estimate Beta. 
Figure 4.5 shows relative price and index developments of each variable. 
                                                 
153 Keller, G., Warrack, B. (2003). Statistics for Management and Economics. Table 8.2: Critical Values of t, p254. 
Brooks/Cole – Thomson Learning 
 70 
Figure 4.5: Relative monthly price and index developments EUA Dec08 and SX5E 
 
 
All Minitab outcomes from Test 2 can be found in Appendix 4.2. The number of 
observations is 37 and descriptive analysis of the data shows a StDev of 13.37% for EUA 
Dec08 and 4.22% for SX5E. As in the previous test, the volatility of EUA Dec08 is higher 
than SX5E. This time it is much higher because of the monthly data used which causes 
larger price leaps. EUA Dec08 shows a relatively good distribution around the mean, while 
SX5E reveals a more skewed position. Critical value of t in this test is t.025,36 = 2.030.
154
 
The correlation between the two series is 0.064 with a P-Value of 0.706 > 0.025 which is 
positive but very small and insignificant.  
 The linear regression gave the following outcome: 
 =  EUA Dec08 = 0.0110 + 0.203 SX5E 
where 
 = 0.203 ;  = 0.4% ; T = 0.38 ; P = 0.706. 
                                                 
154 Keller, G., Warrack, B. (2003). Statistics for Management and Economics. Table 8.2: Critical Values of t, p254. 
Brooks/Cole – Thomson Learning  
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 This would mean that for every 1% increase of SX5E, the EUA Dec08 would 
increase with 0.203%. This shows a much stronger relationship than in Test 1, but it would 
explain only 0.4% of the total risk of EUA Dec08. This means that there are other factors 
considerably more important for driving the price of EUAs. If best financial analysis practice 
should be used, a Beta of 0.203 would be the one to use in a CAPM calculation.  
The t-value is 0.38 and P-Value 0.706. The t value is under the critical value of 2.03 and 
P-Value is over its critical value of 0.025. Hence, this result is not statistically significant and H0 
cannot be rejected. 
4.1.1.3 Test 3: Weekly returns EUA Dec08 and SX5E, January 1st, 
2008 – May 23rd, 2008 
From Chapter 4.2 there are reasons to believe that the market for carbon emissions have 
matured over the last years. By matured means increased volume, liquidity and a wide range 
of different traders. The first phase of the EU ETS was hampered by large problems in the 
allocation of allowances and other political issues. Hence, would the second phase provide a 
more stable environment and closer relation with the EU stock markets? Since monthly data 
will provide a too small population and daily data can cause analysis flaws, this test will use 
weekly (Friday) closing prices from 2008 in order to see if a closer relation can be found. 
Figure 4.6 shows relative price and index developments of each variable. The world‟s and 
Europe‟s stock markets had a slump at the beginning of 2008 and EUA prices had a 
substantial drop during the same period. They have however risen relative to the stock 
market during the rest of the analysis period. May 23
rd
, 2008 is at the end of week 21. 
Figure 4.6: Relative weekly price and index developments EUA Dec08 and SX5E in 2008 
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 All Minitab outcomes from Test 3 can be found in Appendix 4.3. The number of 
observations is 21 and descriptive analysis of the data shows a StDev of 4.00% for EUA 
Dec08 and 2.62% for SX5E. Volatility is higher for EUAs in this test as well, but the 
difference is smaller than it was in Test 2. Critical value of t in this test is t.025,20 = 2.086.
155
 
It is difficult to infer normality from the histograms, and correlation between the two series 
is calculated to be 0.139 with a P-Value of 0.547 > 0.025. This is still a small insignificant 
positive correlation but far larger than the ones found in Test 1 and 2. It is not statistically 
significant. 
 The linear regression gave the following outcome: 
 =  EUA Dec08 = 0,00935 + 0,212 SX5E 
where 
 = 0.212 
 = 1.9% 
 = 0.212 ;  = 1.9% ; T = 0.61 ; P = 0.547. 
 This would mean that for every 1% increase of SX5E, the EUA Dec08 would 
increase with 0.212%. This shows a similar relationship as in Test 2 and a Beta for EUAs of 
about 0.2 is thus believed to be desirable for a CAPM calculaton. However, the linear 
equation explains only 1.9% of the total risk of EUA Dec08. This is larger than the previous 
tests, but there are still factors considerably more influential to the EUA market than the 
performance of EU stock markets.  
 The t-value is 0.61 and P-Value 0.547. The t value is under the critical value of 2.086 and 
P-Value is over its critical value of 0.025. Hence, this result is not statistically significant and H0 
cannot be rejected. 
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Figure 4.7: Sources of Electrical Power 
2005    
4.1.1.4 Test 4: Monthly returns EUA Dec08 and SXEELC, April 22nd, 
2006 – May 23rd, 2008. 
This test deals with the relationship between the EUA Dec08 futures contract and the 
Industry Classification Benchmark for major electricity companies in Europe and the 
Eurozone, SXEELC. Power companies in 
the EU are the largest carbon dioxide 
emitters and traders and it would be 
interesting to see the difference between an 
analysis concerning the market portfolio 
SX5E and the overall performance of power 
companies in SXEELC. Figure 4.7
156
 
describes the main energy sources of 
electrical power in 2005 and gives some in-
depth backup to this fact. The overall main 
source is coal with 51.5%, and fossil fuels 
alone stand for over 70% of the world 
electrical power. 
Monthly returns for the whole data period have been chosen since this is the best 
practice in financial analysis for estimating Betas. Figure 4.8 shows relative price and index 
developments similar to Figure 4.5 but with the SXEELC added as the thick dark yellow 
line. One can clearly see the relationship between SX5E and SXEELC and the correlation 
between the two is calculated to 0.712 with P-Value of 0.00 < 0.025 which is highly 
statistically significant.  
                                                 
156 Energy Information Administration. 2005. "October 2005 Monthly Energy Review: Petroleum"; 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/petro.html> 
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Figure 4.8: Relative monthly price and index developments EUA Dec08 and SX5E 
 
 
All Minitab outcomes from Test 4 can be found in Appendix 4.4. The descriptive statistics 
for EUA Dec08 monthly was given in Test 2 (StDev 13.37% and a relatively good 
distribution around the mean). The SXEELC StDev is 3.84% and the data is relatively well 
distributed around the mean as well. The number of observations is 37 as in Test 2. Critical 
value of t in this test is t.025,20 = 2.030.
157
  Correlation between the two is 0.132 with a P-
Value of 0.435 > 0.025. This is not statistically significant, but the computed correlation is 
however reasonably higher than 0.064 in Test 2.  
 The linear regression gave the following outcome: 
 =  EUA Dec08 = 0,0058 + 0,460 SXEELC 
where 
 = 0.460 ;  = 1.7% ; T = 0.79 ; P = 0.435. 
 As expected, the Beta of 0.460 in this test is higher than the one of 0.203 in Test 2. 
This Beta explains 1.7% of the variation in EUA Dec08, which is 0.9% more than in Test 2.  
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Figure 4.9: Relative weekly price and index developments 
 
 The t-value is 0.79 and P-Value 0.547. The t value is under the critical value of 2.03 but 
higher than 0.38 in Test 2. The P-Value is over its critical value of 0.025 but lower than 0.706 in 
Test 2. Nevertheless, this is result is not statistically significant and H0 cannot be rejected. 
Unsurprisingly, we can infer that the market performances of electricity companies 
within the EU are more, but still not significantly, related to the carbon price than the overall 
stock markets are. It is however not given that if power companies are performing well, the 
demand for EUAs will increase. There are a lot of factors not introduced in these tests that 
are far more influential. This is a complex issue and the test was introduced to spot a 
difference from Test 2.  
4.1.1.5 Test 5: A correlation analysis with oil, April 22nd, 2006 – May 
23rd, 2008. 
Fuel prices as oil and gas are from Figure 4.1 and 4.2 believed to account for 20% of the 
influence of carbon prices. This test will simply look at the correlation between oil prices 
and the price of EUAs. Historical Brent Crude Oil Spot prices are gathered from the US 
Energy Information Administration.
158
 Figure 4.9 shows the relative weekly price 
development of the variables with the Brent spot and EUA Dec08 lines given more weight.  
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This graph gives an interesting overview of the relative price developments. The correlation 
between Brent spot and EUA Dec08 is calculated to 0.137 with a P-Value of 0.082 > 0.025. 
The P-Value is relatively lower than in the previous tests but still not statistically significant.  
Complete correlation calculations can be found in Appendix 4.5. 
4.3.5 Analysis evaluation and conclusion 
This analysis part has firstly dealt with finding a CAPM Beta for EUAs, and secondly with 
whether a linear relationship exists between returns on carbon emission futures and the rate 
of return on the overall stock market.  
After test 2 and 3, the CAPM Beta for EUA Dec08 was set to be around 0.20. This 
means that for every 1% increase of the EU‟s stock market index SX5E, the EUA Dec08 
will increase with 0.20%. This would be interesting theoretical news for the well-diversified 
investor. On the other hand, the relation could only explain 0.4 - 1.9% of the total risk of 
EUA Dec08. This means that more than 98% of the risk of EUA Dec08 is asset specific 
variation and in practice an investor would have to be exceptionally well-diversified to 
eliminate this risk. 
Nonetheless, from the regression analyses, the null hypothesis could not be rejected 
by the outcomes of any of the tests. No test of correlation or regression constant was 
statistically significant in a two-way significance level of 5%. T values were too low and P-
Values too high and would cause Type I error if accepted as appropriate to reject H0. We can 
thus infer that no linear relationship exists between returns on carbon emission futures 
(EUAs) and the rate of return on the overall European stock market.  
Even so, this is an interesting find and as already introduced, there should be other 
factors considerably more important for driving the price of EUAs than the stock markets. 
They were all presented in Chapter 4.1. Other tests could be sought in order to sort this out. 
Such regression models on the price drivers from Ch 4.1 would prove to be very intricate 
and such regressions of this analysis could be argued to have spurious relationships. Such 
spurious relationships give impressions of a worthy link between two groups that is invalid 
when objectively examined. To emphasize a correlation or a simple relationship between 
two variables does not imply that one causes the other. A thorough evaluation needs to be 
done in order to figure out if A causes B, if B causes A or if a new factor C causes both A 
and B. Another option is that some unknown factor is the cause of the relationship between 
 77 
A and B. A third option is that the relationship observed is so complex it can be labeled 
„coincidental‟. The last option is about self-reinforcing when A is causing B when B is 
causing A.  
From the carbon price development in Chapter 4.2, major ups and downs in the 
market were explained by fuel prices, power companies selling or simply „lack of faith in the 
market‟. Since both financials and installations are trading in the market, psychological 
factors of a downturn in the stock market can easily cause a lack of faith in the alternative 
EUA market. The small relationship between stock markets and EUAs are complex but thus 
not believed to be entirely coincidental. Hence, it can be plausible to believe that other 
factors such as oil prices are influencing both stock markets and EUA prices over the period. 
The analysis in Test 5 shows signs of this but no conclusions can be made due to no 
statistically significant outcome.  
This analysis part of the thesis has touched a lot of interesting themes when it comes 
to the carbon emission market. Although the analyses can only explain the relationship 
between April 22, 2005 and May 23, 2008, it is the author‟s view that the non-linear 
relationship between EUAs and European stock markets will persist in the short and middle 
term over the next years. A lot of uncertainties due to the political regulations of the EU ETS 
have caused great swings in the EUA-prices and the outcome of these analyses. And 
although the market have matured and liquidity improved, the uncertain political nature of 
the scheme and other nonsystematic changes will rule out most cyclical movements from 
investors and others trading on both stock markets and energy exchanges. If size increases 
and a global market emerge, the movements of a global carbon price in the long term would 
be related to the overall world production spiced with shocks of technological leaps and 
political and structural changes. Further analytical investigation and other detailed analyses 
regarding multiple regressions of all price drivers, cointegration and Error Correction 
Models were considered in relation to explain the price movements of EUA futures more 
thoroughly. An Error Correction Model is a dynamic model in which the movement of the 
variables in any periods is related to the previous period's gap from long-run equilibrium. 
Such a model requires strong relationships which the existing analyses could not provide. 
Consequently, because of a non-significant outcome, a lack of further price driver data and 
the current comprehensive nature of this thesis it was ruled out. 
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5. Concluding discussion and suggestions for 
further study 
5.1 Summing up 
This thesis has provided a comprehensive overview of the carbon market with focus on the 
EU ETS, and an analysis of the relation between European stock markets and the price of 
EUA futures. Chapter 2 provided a rational essential background about the emergence of 
emissions markets with history of emissions trading, the developments that lead to the Kyoto 
Protocol, and the basic economics behind it. Relatively uncomplicated economic textbook 
models were used to explain why emissions trading has emerged as a cost efficient solution 
to mitigate carbon emissions. Furthermore, the existing markets of carbon emissions were 
explained and a distinct line had to be drawn between the various voluntary markets and 
compliance markets as the EU ETS. Chapter 3 provided an overview of the more practical 
parts of carbon emissions markets, namely the trading. It introduced the variety of products 
that are eligible for trading today, the exchanges where the trading takes place and the 
participants. It furthermore presented an analysis of the relative size of the global carbon 
market compared to the world‟s stock exchanges which showed that the global carbon 
emissions market is projected to be 0.09% of the total capitalization of the world‟s stock 
exchanges in 2007 and thus as large as the Warsaw Stock Exchange in Poland was in 2007. 
Chapter 4 dealt with the price for carbon emissions allowances, what the price drivers are, 
and a broad explanation of the carbon price development of the EU ETS since carbon trading 
commenced in 2005. Moreover, the main analytical challenge of this thesis was presented in 
Chapter 4.5 and provided a comprehensive, albeit easy to follow, study of the relationship 
between the EUA Dec08 futures price and the main European stock markets from April 22, 
2005 to May 23, 2008. The analysis found a CAPM Beta of 0.2 but showed no linear 
relationship exists between returns on EUA Dec08 futures and the rate of return on the 
overall European stock market. 
5.2 Suggestions for further study 
This thesis is comprehensive by nature and has touched a lot of interesting aspects of today‟s 
carbon emissions markets. The focus has been on providing the reader with a good overview 
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of the market and some analyses for backing up or rejecting hypotheses about the market. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the politics and market constantly changes and is believed to 
change fast in the near future as well. Hence, this chapter will finish up with providing some 
aspects of future developments that will be interesting to follow. These are not believed to be 
a major part of this thesis but to function as a stand point for further studies on the topics. 
First of all, the development of the EU ETS will be an essential progress to follow. 
Several possible improvements of the EU ETS were scrutinized by Simon Tilford in a report 
released in October 2007 regarding “How to make EU emissions trading a success”159. Three 
topics were recognized. First, a larger centralization of the scheme is suggested with longer 
time frames of the scheme‟s periods, such as 30-50 years, in order to reflect the underlying 
industries‟ investment horizons. An EU-wide, not country-wise, emission cap for industries 
in order to prevent unequal treatment in Member States that distorts competition is said to be 
needed. By expanding the EU ETS Commission‟s resources one could secure a high degree 
of independence of the regulations. Political influence of the scheme has, as we saw in 
Chapter 4.1, been large. Where a central bank has to stabilize between price stability 
(inflation) and long-term growth and employment, the EU ETS Commission should be 
reformed to work to stabilize between the support of industries and long-term GHG emission 
cuts. New industrial sectors such as transport and agriculture could be introduced into the 
scheme as well but there are large problems with monitoring, regulating and tracking this as 
today‟s date. Second, introducing large scale auctioning of allowances are being suggested, 
where auction profits could be used by governments fund renewable energy investments or 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) for coal-fired power plants.
160
 Third, CCS is an approach 
that captures CO2 from larger fossil power fuel plants and stores it instead of releasing it into 
the atmosphere. Technology for CCS is already commercial available but too high expenses 
and uncertainty about the storage has hindered its commercial development. It is however an 
important issue for the future since roughly half of the CO2 emissions comes from large 
sources.
161
  
                                                 
159 Tilford, S. (2007): “How to make EU emissions trading a success”. Chapter 4. Centre for European Reform 
160 Point Carbon Market News, 13 June, “UK opposition party will use auctioning money to fund CCS”: 
http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.935081  
161 Freund, P., Kaarstad, O (2007): Keeping the Lights on. (Esp. in Chapter 5). Universitetsforlaget   
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The emergence of a US Emissions Trading System would be another interesting 
aspect for the future. An US ETS could quickly become the largest carbon trading scheme in 
the world, and linking it to the EU ETS would be important to avoid international 
competition distortion in certain industrial sectors because of structural differences between 
the schemes.
162
 If this happens, it will be increasingly important for the developed world to 
ensure the developing world‟s follow-up on this in order to prevent industry migration 
because of ever-increasing production cost due to high carbon prices in the EU and US. This 
could be achieved by e.g. comprehensive agreements with developing countries involving 
structural and major trade partners. The steps to prevent competition loss could be achieved 
by using revenues from auctioning to ensure short term tactical tax reliefs or compensations 
in the ETS, and restrict CDM-projects allowed only to complying developing countries. As 
an example, there would be little sense in Europeans striving to improve the environmental 
efficiency of their buildings, if the steel used to construct those buildings is being produced 
inefficiently in China.
163
   
The steps towards a global carbon market will be filled with tricky political obstacles 
or fundamental shifts due to new information of the observed climate change or 
technological shifts. It is however an interesting and important market to follow and a good 
example of basic economics being used in practice to provide the most cost efficient 
solution. 
                                                 
162 Tilford, S. (2007): “How to make EU emissions trading a success”. Centre for European Reform 
163 Tilford, S. (2007): “How to make EU emissions trading a success”. Chapter 6. Centre for European Reform 
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EU-wide cap for 2008-2012, Summary information (all figures are annual):
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Appendix 2 
 
List of Annex I parties to the UNFCCC 
165
 
 
Australia  
Austria  
Belarus **  
Belgium  
Bulgaria  
Canada  
Croatia **  
Czech Republic **  
Denmark  
Estonia  
European Community  
Finland  
France  
Germany  
Greece  
Hungary  
Iceland  
Ireland  
Italy **  
Japan  
Latvia  
Liechtenstein **  
Lithuania  
Luxembourg  
Monaco **  
Netherlands  
New Zealand  
Norway  
Poland  
 
 
Portugal  
Romania  
Russian Federation **  
Slovakia **  
Slovenia **  
Spain  
Sweden  
Switzerland  
Turkey **  
Ukraine **  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
United States of America  
 
 
 
* Observer State 
** Party for which there is a specific COP and/or CMP 
decision 
                                                 
165 Source: UNFCCC website, Parties and Observers: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php  
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List of Non-Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC: 
Afghanistan  
Albania **  
Algeria  
Angola  
Antigua and Barbuda  
Argentina  
Armenia **  
Azerbaijan  
Bahamas  
Bahrain  
Bangladesh  
Barbados  
Belize  
Benin  
Bhutan  
Bolivia  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Botswana  
Brazil  
Burkina Faso  
Burundi  
Cambodia  
Cameroon  
Cape Verde  
Central African Republic  
Chad  
Chile  
China  
Colombia  
Comoros  
Congo  
Cook Islands  
Costa Rica  
Cuba  
Cyprus  
Côte d'Ivoire  
Dem. People's Republic of Korea  
Liberia  
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  
Madagascar  
Malawi  
Malaysia  
Maldives  
Mali  
Malta  
Marshall Islands  
Mauritania  
Mauritius  
Mexico  
Micronesia (Federated States of)  
Mongolia  
Montenegro  
Morocco  
Mozambique  
Democratic Republic of the Congo  
Djibouti  
Dominica  
Dominican Republic  
Ecuador  
Egypt  
El Salvador  
Equatorial Guinea  
Eritrea  
Ethiopia  
Fiji  
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  
Gabon  
Gambia  
Georgia  
Ghana  
Grenada  
Guatemala  
Guinea  
Guinea-Bissau  
Guyana  
Haiti  
Honduras  
India  
Indonesia  
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  
Israel  
Jamaica  
Jordan  
Kazakhstan **  
Kenya  
Kiribati  
Kuwait  
Kyrgyzstan  
Lao People's Democratic Republic  
Lebanon  
Lesotho  
Saint Lucia  
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  
Samoa  
San Marino  
Sao Tome and Principe  
Saudi Arabia  
Senegal  
Serbia  
Seychelles  
Sierra Leone  
Singapore  
Solomon Islands  
South Africa  
Sri Lanka  
Sudan  
Suriname  
Swaziland  
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Myanmar  
Namibia  
Nauru  
Nepal  
Nicaragua  
Niger  
Nigeria  
Niue  
Oman  
Pakistan  
Palau  
Panama  
Papua New Guinea  
Paraguay  
Peru  
Philippines  
Qatar  
Republic of Korea  
Republic of Moldova **  
Rwanda  
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Syrian Arab Republic  
Tajikistan  
Thailand  
Timor-Leste  
Togo  
Tonga  
Trinidad and Tobago  
Tunisia  
Turkmenistan **  
Tuvalu  
Uganda  
United Arab Emirates  
United Republic of Tanzania  
Uruguay  
Uzbekistan **  
Vanuatu  
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  
Viet Nam  
Yemen  
Zambia  
Zimbabwe 
* Observer State        ** Party for which there is a specific COP and/or CMP decision 
 
---- 
 
List of Annex II parties to the UNFCCC: 
 
Australia  
Austria  
Belgium  
Canada  
Denmark  
European Union  
Finland  
France  
Germany  
Greece  
Iceland  
Ireland  
Italy  
Japan  
Luxembourg  
Netherlands  
New Zealand  
Norway  
Portugal  
Spain  
Sweden  
Switzerland  
Turkey  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
United States of America 
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List of Annex B Countries in UNFCCC: 
Australia                              
Austria                                       
Belgium                                       
Bulgaria                                      
Canada                                   
Croatia                                    
Czech Republic                               
Denmark                                       
Estonia                                       
Finland                                       
France (including Monaco)                    
Germany                                      
Greece                                       
Hungary                                      
Iceland                                      
Ireland                                      
Italy (including San Marino)                 
Japan                                        
Latvia                                       
Lithuania                                    
Luxembourg                                   
Netherlands                                  
New Zealand                                  
Norway                                       
Poland                                       
Portugal                                     
Romania                                      
Russian Federation                           
Slovakia                                     
Slovenia                                     
Spain                                        
Sweden                                       
Switzerland (inlcuding Liechtenstein)        
Ukraine                                      
United Kingdom                               
United States of America 
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Appendix 3  
Total value of world’s exchanges: 
 
 
Global carbon market 2008 prediction (Point Carbon): € 63 000 millions 
 
All numbers in millions 0.7293 EUR/USD  
 
Exchange 
Year-to-date, 
2007 (USD) 
Euros, avg 
exch. rate 
2007 
   
  1 NYSE Group 29,209,971.2 21,302,832.0 
 2 Nasdaq 15,320,133.4 11,172,973.3 
 3 London SE 10,324,334.6 7,529,537.2 
 4 Tokyo SE Group 6,475,765.1 4,722,775.5 
 5 Euronext  5,648,451.9 4,119,416.0 
 6 Deutsche Börse 4,323,675.4 3,153,256.4 
 7 Shanghai SE 4,070,072.4 2,968,303.8 
 8 BME Spanish Exchanges  2,970,616.0 2,166,470.3 
 9 Borsa Italiana 2,311,826.9 1,686,015.4 
 10 Hong Kong Exchanges 2,138,698.5 1,559,752.8 
 11 Shenzhen SE 2,102,443.8 1,533,312.3 
 12 Korea Exchange 
1
 2,010,958.7 1,466,592.2 
 13 Swiss Exchange 
5
 1,886,095.1 1,375,529.2 
 14 OMX Nordic Exchange 
4
 1,863,306.8 1,358,909.6 
 15 TSX Group  1,648,617.1 1,202,336.5 
 16 Australian SE 1,378,520.0 1,005,354.6 
 17 Taiwan SE Corp. 1,010,554.5 736,997.4 
 18 National Stock Exchange India 761,074.1 555,051.4 
 19 American SE 670,191.0 488,770.3 
 20 Sao Paulo SE 607,558.2 443,092.2 
 21 Oslo Børs 549,794.0 400,964.7 
 22 JSE  425,325.1 310,189.6 
 23 Singapore Exchange 
2
 381,622.3 278,317.1 
 24 Bombay SE 347,681.8 253,564.3 
 25 Istanbul SE 296,410.2 216,172.0 
 26 Osaka SE 264,434.4 192,852.0 
 27 Bursa Malaysia 169,405.0 123,547.0 
 28 Athens Exchange 169,404.7 123,546.9 
 29 Irish SE 137,029.9 99,935.9 
 30 Wiener Börse 130,082.6 94,869.2 
 31 Mexican Exchange 123,907.7 90,365.9 
 32 Thailand SE 118,259.7 86,246.8 
 33 Jakarta SE 114,468.7 83,482.0 
 34 Tel Aviv SE 101,178.9 73,789.8 
 35 Warsaw SE 87,948.7 64,141.0 * World carbon market 2008 
36 Cairo & Alexandria SEs 60,502.5 44,124.5 
 37 Santiago SE 49,899.0 36,391.4 
 38 Budapest SE  47,551.1 34,679.0 
 39 Philippine SE 29,251.8 21,333.4 
 40 New Zealand Exchange 24,227.3 17,669.0 
 41 Colombia SE 16,849.7 12,288.5 
 
 
*The last 10 exchanges were removed due to lack of space: Lima, Teheran, 
Buenos Aires, Cyprus, Ljubljana, Colombo, Mauritius, Luxembourg, Bermuda 
and Malta. 
 
 
TOTAL $100,417,083.3 € 73,234,178.9 
 
 94 
Appendix 4.1 
Descriptive statistics: 
16,00%8,00%0,00%-8,00%-16,00%-24,00%
Median
Mean
0,40%0,30%0,20%0,10%0,00%-0,10%-0,20%
1st Q uartile -0,011573
Median 0,002077
3rd Q uartile 0,014461
Maximum 0,186526
-0,001488 0,002583
0,000000 0,003371
0,027666 0,030549
A -Squared 15,50
P-V alue < 0,005
Mean 0,000547
StDev 0,029035
V ariance 0,000843
Skewness -1,4393
Kurtosis 16,9772
N 784
Minimum -0,288246
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for EUA Dec08 (daily)
 
 
6,00%3,00%0,00%-3,00%-6,00%-9,00%
Median
Mean
0,15%0,10%0,05%0,00%-0,05%
1st Q uartile -0,004534
Median 0,000635
3rd Q uartile 0,006308
Maximum 0,075335
-0,000512 0,001085
-0,000189 0,001332
0,010850 0,011980
A -Squared 12,98
P-V alue < 0,005
Mean 0,000286
StDev 0,011387
V ariance 0,000130
Skewness -0,9560
Kurtosis 13,0373
N 784
Minimum -0,105118
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for SX5E (daily)
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Correlations: EUA Dec08 (daily); SX5E (daily)  
 
Pearson correlation of EUA Dec08 (daily) and SX5E (daily) = 0,035 
P-Value = 0,321 
 
 
Regression Analysis: EUA Dec08 (daily) versus SX5E (daily)  
 
The regression equation is 
EUA Dec08 (daily) = 0,00052 + 0,0905 SX5E (daily) 
 
 
784 cases used 
 
 
Predictor         Coef   SE Coef     T      P 
Constant      0,000521  0,001037  0,50  0,615 
SX5E (daily)   0,09046   0,09113  0,99  0,321 
 
 
S = 0,0290358   R-Sq = 0,1%   R-Sq(adj) = 0,0% 
 
 
Residual Plot: 
0,0050,000-0,005-0,010
0,2
0,1
0,0
-0,1
-0,2
-0,3
Fitted Value
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
Versus Fits
(response is EUA Dec08 (daily))
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Appendix 4.2: 
Descriptive statistics: 
20,00%10,00%0,00%-10,00%-20,00%-30,00%
Median
Mean
7,50%5,00%2,50%0,00%-2,50%-5,00%
1st Q uartile -0,069433
Median 0,003586
3rd Q uartile 0,100575
Maximum 0,259867
-0,032247 0,056892
-0,040927 0,069775
0,108705 0,173638
A -Squared 0,20
P-V alue 0,874
Mean 0,012322
StDev 0,133674
V ariance 0,017869
Skewness -0,357163
Kurtosis 0,232563
N 37
Minimum -0,354545
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for EUA Dec08
 
 
5,00%0,00%-5,00%-10,00%-15,00%
Median
Mean
2,50%2,00%1,50%1,00%0,50%0,00%-0,50%
1st Q uartile -0,016098
Median 0,018354
3rd Q uartile 0,033143
Maximum 0,060774
-0,007564 0,020550
0,000333 0,024736
0,034286 0,054766
A -Squared 1,23
P-V alue < 0,005
Mean 0,006493
StDev 0,042161
V ariance 0,001778
Skewness -1,73638
Kurtosis 4,43732
N 37
Minimum -0,151685
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for SX5E
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Correlations: EUA Dec08; SX5E  
 
Pearson correlation of EUA Dec08 and SX5E = 0,064 
P-Value = 0,706 
 
 
Regression Analysis: EUA Dec08 versus SX5E  
 
The regression equation is 
EUA Dec08 = 0,0110 + 0,203 SX5E 
 
 
37 cases used 
 
 
Predictor     Coef  SE Coef     T      P 
Constant   0,01100  0,02251  0,49  0,628 
SX5E        0,2035   0,5348  0,38  0,706 
 
 
S = 0,135291   R-Sq = 0,4%   R-Sq(adj) = 0,0% 
 
 
Residual Plot: 
0,020,010,00-0,01-0,02
0,3
0,2
0,1
0,0
-0,1
-0,2
-0,3
-0,4
Fitted Value
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
Versus Fits
(response is EUA Dec08)
 
 98 
Appendix 4.3 
Descriptive statistics: 
4,00%-0,00%-4,00%-8,00%
Median
Mean
3,00%2,00%1,00%0,00%-1,00%
1st Q uartile -0,011026
Median 0,005318
3rd Q uartile 0,041484
Maximum 0,068809
-0,010517 0,025924
-0,010113 0,031838
0,030624 0,057803
A -Squared 0,30
P-V alue 0,546
Mean 0,007704
StDev 0,040028
V ariance 0,001602
Skewness -0,597664
Kurtosis 0,409658
N 21
Minimum -0,090474
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for EUA Dec08
 
 
4,00%2,00%-0,00%-2,00%-4,00%
Median
Mean
1,00%0,50%0,00%-0,50%-1,00%-1,50%-2,00%
1st Q uartile -0,027609
Median -0,010640
3rd Q uartile 0,017126
Maximum 0,041465
-0,019702 0,004188
-0,023073 0,007164
0,020077 0,037895
A -Squared 0,26
P-V alue 0,693
Mean -0,007757
StDev 0,026242
V ariance 0,000689
Skewness 0,247250
Kurtosis -0,848968
N 21
Minimum -0,048908
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for SX5E
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Correlations: EUA Dec08; SX5E  
 
Pearson correlation of EUA Dec08 and SX5E = 0,139 
P-Value = 0,547 
 
Regression Analysis: EUA Dec08 versus SX5E  
 
The regression equation is 
EUA Dec08 = 0,00935 + 0,212 SX5E 
 
 
21 cases used 
 
 
Predictor      Coef   SE Coef     T      P 
Constant   0,009351  0,009273  1,01  0,326 
SX5E         0,2124    0,3465  0,61  0,547 
 
 
S = 0,0406677   R-Sq = 1,9%   R-Sq(adj) = 0,0% 
 
 
Residual Plot: 
0,0200,0150,0100,0050,000
0,050
0,025
0,000
-0,025
-0,050
-0,075
-0,100
Fitted Value
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
Versus Fits
(response is EUA Dec08)
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Appendix 4.4 
Descriptive statistics: 
10,00%5,00%0,00%-5,00%-10,00%
Median
Mean
3,00%2,50%2,00%1,50%1,00%0,50%0,00%
1st Q uartile -0,012518
Median 0,017451
3rd Q uartile 0,032441
Maximum 0,101010
0,001465 0,027083
0,001788 0,027869
0,031242 0,049903
A -Squared 0,28
P-V alue 0,628
Mean 0,014274
StDev 0,038417
V ariance 0,001476
Skewness -0,197091
Kurtosis 0,692209
N 37
Minimum -0,089193
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for SXEELC
 
 
Correlations: EUA Dec08; SXEELC  
 
Pearson correlation of EUA Dec08 and SXEELC = 0,132 
P-Value = 0,435 
 
Regression Analysis: EUA Dec08 versus SXEELC  
 
The regression equation is 
EUA Dec08 = 0,0058 + 0,460 SXEELC 
 
 
37 cases used 
 
 
Predictor     Coef  SE Coef     T      P 
Constant   0,00576  0,02361  0,24  0,809 
SXEELC      0,4600   0,5830  0,79  0,435 
 
 
S = 0,134381   R-Sq = 1,7%   R-Sq(adj) = 0,0% 
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Residual Plot: 
0,050,040,030,020,010,00-0,01-0,02-0,03-0,04
0,3
0,2
0,1
0,0
-0,1
-0,2
-0,3
-0,4
Fitted Value
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
Versus Fits
(response is EUA Dec08)
 
 
 
Correlations: SX5E; SXEELC  
 
Pearson correlation of SX5E and SXEELC = 0,712 
P-Value = 0,000 
 
 
Appendix 4.5 
 
Correlations: Brent spot; EUA Dec08  
 
Pearson correlation of Brent spot and EUA Dec08 = 0,137 
P-Value = 0,082 
 
  
Correlations: Brent spot; SX5E  
 
Pearson correlation of Brent spot and SX5E = -0,055 
P-Value = 0,488 
 
  
Correlations: Brent spot; SXEELC  
 
Pearson correlation of Brent spot and SXEELC = 0,032 
P-Value = 0,689 
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Abbreviations 
(Pages where explanations can be found) 
AAUs   - Assigned Amount Units (p 42) 
AR4   - IPCC‟s fourth assessment report, 2007 (p 17) 
CCS   - Carbon Capture and Storage (p 5, 79) 
CCX    - The Chicago Climate Exchange (p 38) 
CERs   - Certified Emission Reductions (p 40 ++)  
CDM   - Clean Development Mechanism (p 20 ++) 
CITL   - Community Independent Transaction Log, EU (p 36, 44, 60) 
CO2   - Carbon Dioxide 
CO2e   - CO2 equivalent unit (p 11) 
ECX   - European Climate Exchange (p 49) 
EEX   - European Energy Exchange (p 50) 
ERUs   - Emission Reduction Units (p 41) 
ERs   - Emission Reductions (p 43) 
EU  - European Union 
EUAs  - European Union Allowances (p 40) 
EU ETS   - European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (p 30) 
FCCC   - Framework Convention on Climate Change, same as UNFCCC (p 19) 
GDP  - Gross Domestic Product (p 5, 15) 
GHGs  - Greenhouse Gases (p 10) 
GWP  - Global Warming Potential (p 11) 
Installations - I.e. power plants, oil refineries and other carbon intensive factories covered 
by the EU ETS (p 30) 
IPCC  - The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (p 17) 
ITL   - International Transaction Log (UNFCCC) 
JI   - Joint Implementation (p 20 ++) 
LULUCF  - Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (p 42) 
MCA  - Marginal Cost of Abatement (p 22) 
MSC  - Marginal Social Cost  (p 22) 
NAP  - National Allocation Plans (p 30, 44, 59) 
NCDEX - National Commodity & Derivatives Exchange in Mumbai, India (p 50) 
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NGACs  - New South Wales Greenhouse Abatement Certificates (p 42) 
NOX  - Nitrogen Oxides 
NSW GGAS - New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (p 35) 
NZITS  - New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (p 35) 
NYMEX - New York Mercantile Exchange (p 10, 50) 
NYSE  - New York Stock Exchange (p 50) 
OTC  - Over-The-Counter market (p 36) 
ppm  - Parts Per Million 
PPP  - Purchasing Price Parity (p 15) 
RGGI  - Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (p 35) 
RMUs  - Removal Units (p 42) 
UK ETS - The United Kingdom Emissions Trading Scheme (p 37) 
UN  - United Nations 
UNEP  - United Nations Environment Programme (p 17) 
UNFCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (p 19) 
US ETS - United States Emissions Trading Scheme (p 80) 
SAR   - IPCC‟s second assessment report, 1995 (p 17) 
SO2  - Sulfur Dioxide 
SX5E  - Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50® (p 66) 
SXEELC - Dow Jones EURO STOXX® TMI Electricity (p 66) 
TAR   - IPCC‟s third assessment report, 2001 (p 17) 
VERs  - Verified Emission Reductions (p 42) 
WCI  - The Western Climate Initiative (p 39) 
WMO  - World Meteorological Organization (p 17) 
 
 
